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Although the United States has had an active hand in the imple-
mentation of trademark law in China over the past century, the
same frustrations that marked the turn of the twentieth century
are reflected in the twenty-first century. This Article posits that
one of the reasons that the United States has not seen the desired
level of progress in China's protection of trademarks lies in the
imposition of an American theory of trademarks, which has in-
hibited U.S. reform efforts in China to date. This imposition is
understandable, as little thought has been given to the Chinese
theoretical justification for their trademark laws by American or
Chinese scholars. However, this lack of understanding is at the
root of the tension between the two countries. Such continued
confrontation between the United States and China will not be
productive since it will not bring about sustained change in
China.
This Article will attempt to fill in this scholarly gap and provide a
comprehensive and comparative analysis of the Chinese
Trademark Law. Such analysis will show that a type of social
planning theory has been unconsciously adopted for the
theoretical justification of the Trademark Law. With this analysis,
a better understanding of the Chinese perspective of trademark
law can emerge. This understanding is the first step towards an
improvement of the U.S. reform efforts in China and will also
provide the United States with the ability to assist China with
understanding its own theoretical justifications for the Trademark
Law. With new revisions pending to the Trademark Law and the
increased focus of the Chinese government on intellectual
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property matters due to the recent 2008 Beijing Olympics and
the upcoming 2010 Shanghai World Expo, the time is ripe for an
internal education campaign to analyze and understand what
has been unconsciously adopted over the last two decades. A
better informed dialogue will benefit both the United States and
China and assist the Chinese with creating a platform for deep-
rooted, long-term change in their protection of trademarks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is the view of our Government that the judicial protection of
American trade-marks in China, against the infringement or
dealing in infringements by Chinese vendors, is an absolute
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treaty obligation undertaken by the Chinese Government which
cannot be suffered to be questioned. .. .'
In 2008, the Administration will continue its concerted efforts to
ensure that China fully ... adheres to its fundamental obliga-
tions as a WTO member, with particular emphasis on ...
lowering [intellectual property rights] infringement levels in
China .. 2
These two statements, reflective of the U.S. view of China's protec-
tion of intellectual property rights, could have been made
contemporaneously, but for the fact that the first statement was written in
1915 and the second in 2007. Why has the U.S. view3 of China's' protec-
tion of intellectual property not changed over the course of almost a
century of intense negotiations and brinksmanship? 5 There have been
some improvements in recent years, as the past twenty-plus years has
seen more progress than in the first two decades of U.S. activism in
China.6 For example, China passed its first modem trademark law in
1982; amended that law twice in 1993 and 2001; 7 ascended to the World
I. WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, FOREIGN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN CHINA 180-81
(1920) (quoting the Letter of the American Minister at Peking of June 16, 1915 to the Ameri-
can Consul-General at Shanghai).
2. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTO COM-
PLIANCE I I (Dec. 11, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 REPORT].
3. This Article refers to the position and attitudes of the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.) as those of the U.S. government, since the U.S.T.R. is "the
key U.S. government agency charged with pursuing U.S. trade policy." ANDREW C. MERTHA,
THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 52 (2005). In
addition, the views of the U.S.T.R. incorporate the views and concerns of U.S. businesses. See
id. at 56-66.
4. This Article uses the term "China" as an umbrella reference for mainland China that
includes both the time period before the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949
and thereafter.
5. The United States first began its involvement in China to protect American intellec-
tual property rights at the turn of the century with the treaty that ended the Boxer Rebellion,
signed in 1903. See Treaty Between the United States and China for the Extension of the
Commercial Relations Between Them, U.S.-China, Oct. 8, 1903, 33 Stat. 2208, art. II, T.S.
No. 430.
6. From 1903 to 1923, the United States was very active in its demands that China
adhere to its treaty obligations, and the first official trademark law was passed in 1923 by the
Republican government. However, not long after the passage of this law, the events of World
War II began to unfold, and subsequently, little progress was made on trademark laws in
China. After cutting off diplomatic relations with China from 1949 to 1979, the United States
re-initiated its activism in the late 1980s. For a background of the intense negotiations and
brinksmanship from 1989 to 2000, see MERTHA, supra note 3, at 41-52.
7. Shangbiao fa [Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, first amendments adopted by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 22, 1993, and second amendments adopted by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2001) 2001 FA GuI HuI BIAN 112 (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter Trademark Law], available at http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?
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Trade Organization ("WTO") in 2001 and, as a result, became a signa-
tory to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS").8 In addition, China is currently drafting a third
amendment to the Trademark Law that will result in its complete over-
haul. 9 However, the United States feels there is much more still to be
done.'0 The U.S.T.R. points to the problems in China of enforcing intel-
lectual property laws, as such enforcement is bogged down by a variety
of seemingly insurmountable issues." The U.S. Customs and Border
Protection shows that for the fiscal year 2007, approximately 80 percent
of the counterfeit products seized originated in China. Of these seized
products, approximately 61 percent were counterfeited footwear, apparel
and accessories, which were worth about $118.9 million. 3
This Article posits that one of the reasons why the United States has
not seen the progress it desires in China is due to an inappropriate impo-
sition of the U.S. theory of trademark law onto the Chinese system.
Since the United States has viewed the Chinese trademark laws through
the lens of U.S. theory, negotiators have crafted their arguments and
a_no=2170&colno=l 19&dir=200603. Reference to the Trademark Law in this Article also
includes the implementing regulations and the binding interpretations issued by the Supreme
People's Court. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. There are also a number of other
measures that may affect trademark protection in China (such as criminal laws or customs
regulations).
8. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
9. Lisa Wang, China's Evolving Trademark Law: Key Changes in the Third Draft
Amendment, CHINA L. & PRAC., Feb. 2008, at 36, available at LEXIS (China Law & Practice
file).
10. See OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19 (Apr. 30, 2008)
[hereinafter 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT] ("The United States recognizes and appreciates the
efforts of the many officials in China who continue to give voice to China's commitment to
protecting intellectual property rights and are working hard to make it a reality. In spite of
these efforts, the shared goal of significantly reducing [intellectual property rights] infringe-
ment throughout China has not yet been achieved.").
II. See id. at 21 ("[E]nforcement efforts, particularly at the local level, are hampered by
poor coordination among Chinese Government ministries and agencies, local protectionism
and corruption, high thresholds for initiating investigations and prosecuting criminal cases,
lack of training, and inadequate and non-transparent processes.").
12. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SEIZURE
STATISTICS: MID-YEAR FY 2008, at 2 (May 2008), available at http:llwww.cbp.gov/
linkhandler/cgov/tradelpriority-trade/ipr/seizurelfy07-final.cttfyO7_final.
13. Id. at 7. In addition, counterfeit footwear originating from China accounted for 98
percent of all seized counterfeit footwear. Id. at 6.
14. The U.S. theory of trademark law is widely acknowledged to be utilitarianism. See
infra note 24.
15. The term "negotiators" refers to all entities that have tried to persuade China to
revise its trademark laws, including the U.S.T.R., non-governmental organizations, such as the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and U.S. businesses.
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talking points based upon this U.S. theory, which has not resonated well
with their Chinese counterparts.16
Arguably this imposition is understandable because there has never
been a comprehensive analysis of the underlying theory of the Chinese
trademark laws published in the United States or China." As a result, the
United States has not had the opportunity to understand Chinese trade-
mark laws from a Chinese perspective. While the United States has
adopted a utilitarian justification for its trademark laws, ' 8 it would be
tempting to assume that China has done so as well, because the United
States has had a heavy hand in implementing and revising China's cur-
rent trademark laws since the late 1980s.' 9 However, China has not
adopted this justification.
This Article will attempt to fill in the scholarly gap in the underlying
theories and provide a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the
Chinese Trademark Law. This analysis will show that a type of "social
planning theory" has been adopted by China, with distributive and wel-
fare components.' ° With this analysis, a better understanding of the
Chinese perspective of trademark law can emerge, which is the first step
towards improving U.S. reform efforts in China.2'
16. An example that highlights the misapplication of U.S. theory and the conflict be-
tween the two countries is the WTO dispute settlement filed by the United States, China-
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (DS362).
See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China-Measures Affecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/7 (Aug. 21, 2007)
[hereinafter Panel Request]. The arguments put forth by the United States contain utilitarian-
based concerns such as free-riding, which have not proven effective with the Chinese govern-
ment. The lack of effectiveness can be inferred from the need to begin the dispute settlement
process. See infra note 226. The U.S. utilitarian concerns are stated fully in the First U.S.
Submission, see infra note 257, as well as in the Second U.S. Submission, see infra note 234.
For a discussion of these utilitarian-based concerns contained within the Panel Request, supra,
and their application, see infra Part V.A.
17. To borrow liberally from Shakespeare, "much ado" has not been made about the
theory of the Chinese Trademark Law.
18. See sources cited infra note 24.
19. Almost concurrently with the naming of China to the priority watch list under Spe-
cial 301 in 1989, China and the United States concluded a Memorandum of Understanding.
See Structural Impediment Initiatives, the Semiconductor and Construction Agreement with
Japan, and Multilateral Talks of Shipbuilding Subsidiaries: Hearing Before the Int'l Trade
Subcomm. of the S. Fin. Comm., 102d Cong. (1991) (statement of Joseph Massey, Asst. U.S.
Trade Rep.). U.S. activism has been almost non-stop since. See generally MERTHA, supra note
3 (presenting an in-depth analysis of the external pressure on China's intellectual property
laws by the United States).
20. The phrase "social planning theory" was coined by Professor William Fisher as a
way to group together various components that fit under the same theoretical umbrella. See
William W. Fisher, II, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1203,
1215 (1998) [hereinafter, Fisher, Property & Contract].
21. The second step, which is reconciling the two different theoretical frameworks, is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part II will
provide a background in the theoretical conflict between the United
States and China. Part III will then lay a theoretical and historical foun-
dation with a brief discussion of the utilitarian and social planning
theories, followed by a comparative review of American and Chinese
history of trademark law. Part IV analyzes the text of the Lanham Act
and the Trademark Law in order to demonstrate that the Chinese have
adopted a social planning theory of trademark law. While this Article
attempts only to provide the first step towards improving the U.S. efforts
in China, two potential applications of such understanding of the Chi-
nese theoretical framework can be used immediately. Part V discusses
these two potential practical applications: first, a reframing of the discus-
sions between the United States and China, and second, an improvement
of the educational initiatives that are aimed at China.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The conflict between the United States and China reflects Professor
Margaret Chon's question, the "[intellectual property] balance question
... [is] which social group (creators or users) is entitled to use of a par-
ticular type of social good (that is, an [intellectual property]-protected
knowledge good. 22 With respect to trademarks, the United States is try-
ing to increase the protection its businesses (as trademark creators)
receive in China for its trademarked brands and China (as a trademark
user) is attempting to provide protection for such trademarks but also
allow access to the goodwill of such brands as a method of wealth redis-
tribution.23
In attempting to resolve this conflict, the United States has ap-
proached the issue with arguments based on its theoretical framework for
trademark law: utilitarianism. Such an approach has ignored that China
22. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property "from Below": Copyright and Capability for
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 808 (2007).
23. See infra Part IV.B.
24. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 10 (4th ed., 2006) ("Utilitarian theory,
and the economic framework built upon it, has long provided the dominant paradigm for ana-
lyzing and justifying the various forms of intellectual property protection."); Yochai Benkler,
Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 59
(2001) ("[Tlhe basic ideological commitment of American intellectual property is actually
heavily utilitarian, not Lockean or Hegelian. The Supreme Court has held consistently and
unanimously that American law explicitly treats intellectual property rights in utilitarian
terms, as limited monopolies granted to the extent necessary to create incentives for produc-
tion."); see also Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV.
2099, 2105-08 (2004) (summarizing the standard economic justification for trademark law in
the United States); Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH.
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has adopted a social planning theory for its trademark laws, embodying
consumer welfare and distributive concepts. Of the two concepts, the
distributive concept lies at the root of the conflict; gaining an under-
standing of this concept from the Chinese perspective is crucial to an
eventual reconciliation of the two perspectives.
Wealth redistribution is one way that the Chinese government is at-
tempting to foster its economic development vision, which is to
"eliminate poverty without polarizing society into rich and poor strata.' '2
Chinese policymakers firmly believe that trademarks are one of the keys
to economic success.26 First, providing some trademark protection lures
foreign investment into China (through manufacturing and other busi-
• 27
ness investment). This foreign investment, in turn, creates a positive
effect on industrial development in China.28 Redistribution of the wealth
stemming from trademark protection29 provides a base to Chinese enti-
ties to build up their own brands and create its own domestic
businesses. °
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 189, 194, 249 (2006) (acknowledging that utilitarianism, or
economic theory, provides the main justification for trademark law in the United States).
25. CARLOS WING-HUNG Lo, CHINA'S LEGAL AWAKENING 29 (1995) (quoting Deng
Xiaoping).
26. See, e.g., SAIC Deputy Director Li Dongsheng: Development of Administrative
Trademark Protection in China, June 14, 2007, http://www.china.org.cn (translated and
available at http://www.english.ipr.gov.cn (follow "News" hyperlink; then follow "Govern-
ment" hyperlink) [hereinafter Protection in China].
27. See Keith E. Maskus, Sean M. Dougherty & Andrew Mertha, Intellectual Property
Rights and Economic Development in China in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT
295, 300 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005) (explaining that trademark protection
provides incentives for "entry of new firms and development of new products with quality
guarantees," which then positively effects industrial development in the domestic market).
28. See id.
29. See Wang Qishan, Opinion, No More Chinese Knock-Offs, WALL ST. J., June 17,
2008, at A23 ("[China] will ensure a better mesh of our [intellectual property rights] policy
... to uphold people's rights to properly use the information and fruits of innovation in ways
permitted by law ... and make sure that innovation achievements are shared more equita-
bly."); see also Newsletter Regarding IPR, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 19, 2008 (translated and
available at http://www.english.ipr.gov.cn (follow "Activities" hyperlink; then follow "News-
letter regarding IPR" hyperlink) (former Vice Premier Wu Yi stated, "The progress [China has
made] in [intellectual property rights] protection has safeguarded the legitimate rights of [in-
tellectual property rights] owners and guaranteed fair economic order."). Court cases give
additional evidence of this strategy; for example, Pfizer was not allowed to claim the exclusive
use of the mark "wei ge" for their Viagra drug, allowing other new market entrants to use the
popular name for similar drugs. See Pfizer Appeals After Losing Battle for Chinese Name of
Viagra, XINHUA, Feb. 7, 2007, available at LEXIS (Xinhua General News Service file). How-
ever, Pfizer did win a ruling that its trademarked shape for Viagra could be protected from
infringement. See Viagra Trademark Protection Is Dangerous for Chinese Drug Makers-
Lawyers, CHINA BUSINESS NEWS ON-LINE, Dec. 28, 2006, available at LEXIS (China Busi-
ness News On-Line file).
30. China Starts "Trademark Strategy" Plan, IPR IN CHINA, May23, 2008, http://
www.english.ipr.gov.cn (follow "News" hyperlink; then follow "Government" hyperlink)
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This conflict over trademark protection in China has been ongoing
for the last century.3' The U.S.T.R. has consistently placed China at the
top of its list of countries that do not provide adequate intellectual prop-
erty protection. In contrast, China has objected to this label, claiming to
be compliant with its obligations to the United States and the interna-
tional community." Until China's ascension to the WTO in 2001, the
United States was able to use coercive tactics, such as trade sanctions,
when negotiations broke down in order to induce change in China. '
Since 2001, the ability of the United States to use such tactics has been
greatly reduced,35 so when the United States has since resorted to similar
tactics (such as its Special 301 review process or filing DS362), the lack
36
of cooperation from the Chinese resulted in very little progress. In re-
cent decades, the conflict has escalated, as highlighted by the WTO
DS362 dispute.33 While the United States has only included three spe-
("The development of China's own brands is still weak compared to other countries, which
does not fit China's status in global economy and trade."); Zeng Peiyan: To Speed Up Devel-
opment of Products with Independent IP Brands, SIPO, Dec. 28, 2007, http://
www.sipo.gov.cn/sipoEnglish (follow "News" link; then follow "IPR Special" Link).
31. See supra note 5.
32. China has been on the U.S.T.R.'s priority watch list since 2005. See OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REP., 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT I (Apr. 29, 2005); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REP., 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT I (Apr. 28, 2006); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2007
SPECIAL 301 REPORT 2 (Apr. 30, 2007); 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 10, at 10.
33. West Wrong to Criticize IPR Record: Official, IPR IN CHINA, Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.english.ipr.gov.cn (follow "News" hyperlink; then follow "Government" hyper-
link).
34. See Peter K. Yu, The Sweet and Sour Story of Chinese Intellectual Property Rights,
in TECHNOLOGY, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY: A HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT (Graham Dutfield and Uma Suthersanen eds., forthcoming 2008) (manuscript
at 1, available at www.peteryu.comlsweetsour.pdf) [hereinafter Yu, Sweet and Sour].
35. While the United States still threatens to use U.S. trade laws to force China to im-
plement its WTO obligations (see 2007 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-12), it is questionable
whether the United States intends to employ sanctions before exhausting all other WTO reme-
dies. See Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 7.95-97
WT/DS I52/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
36. See U.S. Piracy Complaints Against China Will Seriously Damage Cooperation:
Vice Premier, Apr. 24, 2007, XINHUA, available at LEXIS (Xinhua General News Service
File) (Vice Premier Chair Wu Yi stated, "[The WTO complaint] will seriously undermine
bilateral cooperation on intellectual property rights (IPR) under the Joint Commission on Com-
merce and Trade framework ...."); Scott Otteman, U.S., China to Fight Legal Battle on IPR
Enforcement in WTO Next Week, INSIDE US-CHINA TRADE, Apr. 9, 2008, available at LEXIS
(Inside US-China Trade) ("After the U.S. filed the two [intellectual property rights]-related cases
last year, Chinese bilateral cooperation on improving its enforcement of [intellectual property
rights] has largely ground to a halt as Chinese officials expressed dismay over the legal filings.");
see also 2007 REPORT, supra note 2, at 78. After suspending all intellectual property-related
dialogue with the United States due to the WTO filings in April 2007, China finally agreed to
recommence the dialogue with the United States regarding intellectual property protection in
June 2008. See Scott Otteman, China Agrees to Restart Bilateral IPR Talks, Releases National
Plan, INSIDE US-CHINA TRADE, June 18, 2008, available at LEXIS (Inside US-China Trade).
37. See infra Part V.A.
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cific areas of Chinese policy and law that the United States alleges vio-
lates TRIPS,38 there are a number of other items that the United States
believes need to be changed as well.39 Thus, notwithstanding the out-
come of the WTO panel report,4° the conflict between the two countries
will undoubtedly continue unless there is a change in U.S. strategy.4'
The first step in improving the success of U.S. efforts in China, and
potentially even reconciling the conflict between the two countries, is for
the United States and China to come to an understanding of the Chinese
social planning theory that underlies the Chinese Trademark Law.4'2 A
continued misapplication of the U.S. utilitarian theory of trademark law
(and an ignorance of the Chinese theoretical framework) will not pro-
duce long-lasting change in China, as it ignores the Chinese goals for its
trademark law, in addition to causing anger and tensions in both coun-
tries.
This Article aims to assist American policymakers by providing
them with the needed understanding of the Chinese theory of trademark
law. In addition, this Article will remedy the self-admitted confusion of
Chinese policymakers and jurists through a comprehensive analysis of
this theory. China's current trademark laws have not been effectively
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 10, at 22 (internet counterfeiting
and piracy), 23 (retailing of counterfeit and pirated products, utilizing specialized intellectual
property courts, etc.).
40. The WTO released its panel report for this dispute, DS362, on January 26, 2009.
See Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, WT/DS362JR (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter DS362 Panel Report]. The Panel
found partly in favor of China and partly in favor of the United States. See id. $ 8.1.
41. See supra note 35. While it may be in China's best interest to implement short-term
policies, such as government-sponsored anti-counterfeiting raids and campaigns in order to
show the United States and the international community that China is committed to effective
trademark protection (as was recently seen with the 2008 Beijing Olympics), history provides
evidence that such policies are likely to be short-term and superficial. See MERTHA, supra
note 3, at 144; MOFCOM and SAIC Require Strict IPR Protection During Olympic Period,
IPR IN CHINA, July 23, 2008, www.english.ipr.gov.cn/en/news.shtml [hereinafter Strict IPR
Protection] (follow "More" hyperlink under "Government" section). Persuading China that
longer lasting change is needed requires an understanding of the theory underlying such laws
in order to better craft persuasive arguments.
42. The Chinese acknowledge a need for a theoretical understanding. See National
Working Group for IPR Protection, China's Action Plan on IPR Protection 2007,
June 4, 2007, pt.lI.X.(II), http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a-no=67391&col_
no--925&dir=200704 [hereinafter National Working Group, 2007 Action Plan]. This need for
a theoretical understanding (but for more specific areas, such as criminal and customs en-
forcement areas) was further acknowledged in the 2008 Action Plan, see National Working
Group for IPR Protection, China's Action Plan on IPR Protection 2008, Mar. 18, 2008,
pts.lI.X(I)l, II.X(l)9, II.X(II)3, II.X(II)6, http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/enlinfo/Article.jsp?a-
no=197210&colno=102&dir=200804 [hereinafter National Working Group, 2008 Action
Plan].
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drafted and are subject to wildly varying interpretations. An under
standing of the theory underlying the trademark laws will also assist
Chinese policymakers with revising the Trademark Law and jurists with
promulgation of judicial interpretations, as well as nationwide policies
and educational programs for jurists will help curb haphazard applica-
tion.44 As a civil law system, China's jurists need a deep understanding of
the theory underlying the principles of their trademark laws to interpret
and apply them as uniformly as possible.4 ' As these jurists currently lackS• 46
such understanding and do not follow the process of stare decisis,, the
application of the Trademark Law has appeared haphazard to the United
States, and this has resulted in continuous tension and anger between the
two countries.47
III. FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN AND CHINESE TRADEMARK LAW
As previously stated, the main goal of this Article is to provide
American policymakers with an understanding of Chinese trademark law
in order to become more effective long-term influencers of change in
China. Comparison of the theoretical and historical foundations of
American and Chinese trademark law will aid in the comprehension of
the modern-day status quo and will aid American policymakers in under-
43. See MERTHA, supra note 3, at 221.
44. An example of this haphazard application can be seen in trademark infringement
cases where the Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court Concerning the Application of
Laws in the Trial of Cases of Civil Disputes Arising From Trademarks (promulgated by the
Supreme People's Ct., Oct. 12, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Jan. 11, 2009) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter Supreme Ct. Interpretation]) has been applied. Examples can be found at
http://www.lawinfochina.com (search "Civil Disputes Trademarks") (last visited Jan. I1,
2009) [hereinafter LAWINFoCHINA]. In Toyota Motor Corp. v. Geely Group Corp. (Beijing
No. 2 Interm. People's Ct., Nov. 24, 2003), CHINA L. & PRAC., Dec. 2003, the Beijing No. 2
Intermediate People's Court held for the defendant based on an application of Article 10 of the
Supreme Ct. Interpretation; but see Starbucks Corp. v. Shanghai Starbucks Cafe Co., Shanghai
No. 2 Interm. People's Court, Dec. 31, 2005, upheld on appeal, Shanghai Higher People's Ct.,
Dec. 20, 2006, available at LAWINFOCHINA. In that case, the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate
People's Court held for the plaintiff based on the same Article 10. To an outsider, the "Merry"
mark and the "Shanghai Starbucks Caff" mark both contain enough elements pursuant to
Article 10 to warrant trademark infringement in both cases. While there could be other reasons
for these varied in court decisions, to the U.S. observer, these differing results appear to be
haphazard and without much logical basis.
45. The term "jurist" also refers to China's administrative agency officials, as China has
a two-track enforcement mechanism that allows for trademark infringement cases to be heard
by administrative agencies, rather than resorting to the more time-consuming and expensive
court system. See XIAOWEN TIAN, MANAGING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN CHINA 235
(2007).
46. See WEI Luo, CHINESE LAW & LEGAL RESEARCH 105 (2005); see also DANIEL
C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 212 (2003).
47. See supra notes 33, 36.
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standing the differences and similarities between U.S. and Chinese
trademark law.
A. Theoretical Foundations
There are several theories justifying intellectual property rights gen-
erally and in trademark law specifically, 8 including utilitarianism,
Lockean, Hegelian, and social planning. 9 Respectively, the United States
and China have adopted utilitarianism and social planning (whether ex-
plicitly or implicitly) as the theories underlying their trademark laws. As
such, while the Lockean and Hegelian theories provide interesting coun-
terpoints to the utilitarian and social planning theories, the following
section will provide a brief overview of the two theories primarily used
in the United States and China today.0
1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism, as applied to intellectual property law, is an assess-
ment of the consequences of maximizing the benefits to society as a
whole, rather than prioritizing individual benefits.' Specifically, as ap-
plied to trademark law, utilitarianism in American legal jurisprudence
justifies legal protection because the protection of trademarks maximizes
a benefit to society, namely, reduced search costs associated with the
purchase of products.52 Such protection provides brand owners with in-
48. See generally William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (pro-
viding an overview of four theories of intellectual property) [hereinafter Fisher, Theories];
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (discussing
labor and personality theories); Bone, supra note 24, at 2104-16 (describing the various theo-
ries that can underlie trademark protection).
49. Fisher, Theories, supra note 48, at 169-73. A Lockean theory of intellectual prop-
erty rights premises protection on the natural right to the product of one's efforts. Locke's
famous proviso states, "The Labour of one's Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say,
are properly his." JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed.,
2d ed. 1967). An alternative to Lockean theory is Hegelian, which premises protection on the
reasoning that "an idea belongs to its creator because the idea is a manifestation of the crea-
tor's personality or self." See Hughes, supra note 48, at 330.
50. For in-depth discussions regarding the Lockean and Hegelian theories with respect
to intellectual property generally, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533
(1993) and Hughes, supra note 48.
51. See Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Introduction to UTILITARIANISM AND BE-
YOND 4 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) ("Utilitarianism is thus a species of
welfarist consequentialism-that particular form of it which requires simply adding up indi-
vidual welfares or utilities to assess the consequences ... ") (emphasis in original); see also
David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 Mo. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004); Ramsey,
supra note 24, at 215.
52. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV.
621, 623 (2005); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law,
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centives to improve the quality of their trademarked products. 3 A noted
American economist theorized that without trademark protection, "[t]he
result would be a race to produce inferior products, rather than competi-
tion to produce better ones." In addition, since there is "information
capital embodied in a trademark," trademark protection also provides
incentives to owners to invest in their trademark not only by improving
the quality of the underlying product but also in other ways, such as ad-
vertising.55 Overprotection is balanced by taking into account the costs of
trademark protection, such as enforcement costs (costs to society to en-
force the protection of trademarks), transaction costs (higher prices for
branded products), and barriers to entry (higher costs to enter an already-
established market with branded products).
5 6
Utilitarianism has been firmly adopted in the United States as the
theoretical justification for American trademark law. 7 American courts
favor the objectivity of utilitarianism in order to balance the costs arising
from trademark law with its benefits and arrive at an optimal level of
18 59protection.58 While there are many criticisms of utilitarianism, one
78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 271 ("[A] trademark conveys information that allows the consumer
to say to himself, 'I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase
because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that
of the brand I enjoyed earlier.' "). See also S. REP. No. 100-515, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.A.N.N. 5577, 5580.
53. Robert E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks: Prop-
erty or Monopoly?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 911, 931 (1990) ("A price premium over and
above costs of production (including a normal profit) can create incentives for firms to pro-
duce high quality products. These price premiums represent the return to investment in brand-
names or trademarks.").
54. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 2:4 (4th ed. 2008) (citing to THE CRASWELL REPORT 7 (1979) (FTC Policy Planning Issues
Paper: Trademarks, Consumer Information and Barriers to Competition, FRC Office of Policy
Planning)).
55. Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 271-72.
56. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 173 (2003) (discussing premiums associated with brand prod-
ucts); Bone, supra note 24, at 2123 (discussing various enforcement costs). One of the costs
not necessarily considered by jurists is the potential for "monopoly of words" or the curtail-
ment of free speech. Professor Landes and Judge Posner make a case for the "monopoly of
words" as a cost to protection of trademarks. See LANDES & POSNER, supra, at 169-72.
57. See sources cited supra note 24. Utilitarianism also provides the theoretical justifi-
cation for American intellectual property laws in general.
58. See Fisher, Theories, supra note 48, at 170 ("Awareness of [the] benefits and harms
should (and usually does) ... guide legislators and judges when tuning trademark law; marks
should be (and usually are) protected when they are socially beneficial and not when they are,
on balance, deleterious.")
59. See, e.g., Sen & Williams, supra note 51, at 5 (arguing that utilitarianism is a "dras-
tic obliteration of usable information"); McGowan, supra note 51, at 9 ("It is hard to apply
rule utilitarianism to practical problems."); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copy-
right as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 539 (1990) ("The normative use of
economics in [intellectual property] suffers from, among other things, the problems inherent
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benefit is the ability of the theory to objectively account for the costs and
benefits associated with trademark protection and actively respond to
that information, while maintaining sufficient incentives to maximize the
societal benefit gained from trademarks. This objectivism is quite differ-
ent from the more subjective analysis of social planning, as discussed
infra.
2. Social Planning
a. Overview of the Social Planning Theory
The term "social planning theory" was coined by Professor William
Fisher as a way to solidify various ideas proposing that intellectual prop-
erty rights "can and should be shaped so as to help foster the
achievement of a just and attractive culture."6 These various ideas in-
clude "Consumer Welfare", "A Cornucopia of Information and Ideas", a
"Rich Artistic Tradition", "Distributive Justice", "Semiotic Democracy",
"Sociability" and "Respect."6' Social planning theory primarily differs
from utilitarianism "in its willingness to deploy visions of a desirable
society richer than the conceptions of 'social welfare' deployed by utili-
,,62tarians.
Comparing trademarks to other types of intellectual property, social
planning theory is not as widely applied to trademarks as it is to copy-
63
rights or patents. One reason could be the commercial aspect of
trademarks, which does not lend itself as easily to a dialogue of most of
the social planning theory concepts. While trademarks have become im-
portant symbols in daily life, extending beyond the underlying
in defining and measuring society's welfare."). See generally Bernard Williams, A Critique of
Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST 77 (1973).
60. Fisher, Property & Contract, supra note 20, at 1214-15.
61. Id. at 1216-18 (providing a brief explanation of each theory).
62. Fisher, Theories, supra note 48, at 172.
63. See generally Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Prop-
erty Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 717 (2007) (presenting an analysis of copyright and patent protection with a focus on
distributional considerations); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the
Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Opera-
tors, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995) (arguing that in a digital environment, social
costs to dialogue and distributive choices should be considered when debating copyright prin-
ciples and doctrines); William W. Fisher, 111, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1744 (1988) (formulating the fair use doctrine from the perspective of the "good life"
and "good society" conceptualizations) [hereinafter, Fisher, Fair Use]; Michael Madow, Pri-
vate Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125
(1993) (questioning the fight of publicity due to the costs to society of "free expression and
cultural pluralism"); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283 (1996) (refraining copyright protection from a "democratic paradigm" stand-
point).
Fall 20081
66 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:53
products,' there may still remain a bias towards viewing trademarks as
having nothing more to add to society than mere symbols used to pur-
chase products.
While several components of social planning theory have existed as
long, or perhaps longer, than the other theories, as applied to intellectual
property, it is acknowledged that social planning theory as a whole is
less developed and less recognized." There are at least two reasons for
this. First, since defining the ideal uses of intellectual property in society
is subjective, judicial decisions could vary radically based on an individ-
ual's subjective understanding of trademark law. 66 Second, social
planning has overtones of paternalism, which may help to explain why
U.S. courts have traditionally shied away from using such theory to
promote intellectual property, preferring to rely on more objective theo-
ries, such as utilitarianism. 67 However, these two reasons may help
explain why social planning theory has been adopted in China, as
China's history is steeped in subjective governance and paternalism. 
6
64. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972-73 (1993)
("trademarks play a significant role in our public discourse"); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 397, 397 (1990) ("ideograms that once functioned solely as signals denoting the source,
origin, and quality of goods, have become products in their own right, valued as indicators of
the status, preferences, and aspirations of those who use them"); Jessica Litman, Breakfast
with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1727-28 (1999)
("Consumers have come to attach enormous value to trade symbols, and it is no longer un-
common to see the symbols valued far in excess of the worth of the underlying products they
identify.").
65. Fisher, Theories, supra note 48, at 173 ("[a]s yet, however, this fourth approach is
less well established and recognized than the other three.").
66. Fisher, Property & Contract, supra note 20, at 1215-16 ("[W]hat are the features of
a just and attractive culture? The difficulty of answering that question is, I think, the principal
reason the method has not gained more adherents...").
67. Id.; but cf MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 1:18 ("Unfair competition law is probably
unique in the sense that many judges are not reluctant to reveal that they do draw upon their
own conceptions of 'morality' in deciding a close case. Judicial characterizations of commer-
cial morality may assume picturesque qualities.").
68. See WILLIAM ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 23-25 (Stan. Univ. Press 1995); see also HAROLD
E. GORST, CHINA 136-49 (Sands & Co. 1899). See generally JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE
GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY (2d ed. 2005); CHANG-TU Hu, CHINA: ITS PEOPLE, ITS
SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE (Hsiao Hsia ed., 1960). Localism, or subjective governance (meaning
purposeful decentralization of the government in consideration of the vast differences in local
conditions) was prevalent during the Imperial era, and although the Communist Party tried to
centralize the government after 1949, localism was re-introduced in the reform era of the late
1970s. See MERTHA, supra note 3, at 26 (discussing the "fragmented authoritarianism" that
increased during the reforms beginning in the late 1970s (citing Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Intro-
duction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model and Its Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY,
POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 8 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M.
Lampton eds., 1992)); Andrew Mertha, Putting Your Mouth Where Your Money Is, in CHINA'S
FOREIGN TRADE POLICY: THE NEW CONSTITUENCIES 59, 64 (Ka Zeng ed., 2007) (discussing
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The Chinese tradition of paternalism, augmented by the socialist ideals
of the current Chinese government, has created an environment where
the government is not averse to imposing its vision of a better Chinese
society.69 The two main goals of the Chinese theory of trademarks di-
rectly embody the concept of deploying a vision of the "desirable"
Chinese society.
70
b. Consumer Welfare
Consumer welfare is defined both literally and figuratively. 7' The lit-
eral meaning, concern for the health and safety of consumers, is apt with
respect to trademarks, as "[t]rademarks fix responsibility."" The source
identifier7 1 provides a way to find the manufacturer of the product. If a
product turns out to be defective and harmful to the health or safety of
the consumer, the original manufacturer can be tracked down and held
74liable. In essence, under this concept, manufacturers need to provide a
level of quality in their products so as to not harm the consuming public.
Interestingly, this literal interpretation of consumer welfare appears
very similar to the utilitarian concern about quality. Under the utilitarian
the lack of control the national government in Beijing has over the local governments with
respect to threats of retaliation against foreign businesses who complain about a lack of effec-
tive intellectual property enforcement). However, localism is threatening to cause increased
widespread differences in application of trademark laws in China. See Maskus, Dougherty &
Mertha, supra note 27, at 309-10 (discussing the decentralized nature of the bureaucracies in
charge of enforcing intellectual property rights).
69. As such, the downsides to social planning theory identified by Professor Fisher are
not detracting factors from the Chinese perspective. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
The adoption of a social planning theory does not necessarily equate with a lack of compli-
ance with TRIPS. However, there are certain provisions (or lack thereof) in the current laws
that do not necessarily meet the TRIPS requirements. See infra Part V and the discussion
therein.
70. Since the Chinese social planning theory is premised on consumer welfare and
distributive theories, see infra Part lV.B., the former a traditional concept of trademarks and
the latter a commercial utility view, this Article does not contend that the current Chinese
theory is intended to foster anything but the health and safety of consumers, while at the same
time redistributing the wealth gained through trademarks. While outside the scope of this Arti-
cle, it would be interesting to analyze whether the other "social planning" goals identified by
Professor Fisher could take root in China one day.
71. Professor Fisher describes consumer welfare with respect to intellectual property as
a "guideline [that] urges us to select a combination of rules that will maximize consumer wel-
fare by optimally balancing incentives for creativity with incentives for dissemination and
use." Fisher, Theories, supra note 48, at 192.
72. MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 2:4; see also FRANK 1. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 47 (1925).
73. The term "source identifier" is used to distinguish between the modem trademark (a
type of property embodying the goodwill of the trademark) and the symbols used to identify
the source of the product. See MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 5:1 (the "prime function [source
identifier] was to trace defective merchandise back to workman.")
74. Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks-From
Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 319 (1992).
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theory, without consistent quality, consumers are not in a position to
purchase products by relying only on the trademark."
The difference between the two theories, vis A vis the consumer and
quality, is in their applications. The American utilitarian notion of qual-
ity is tied to an economic efficiency concept, namely, that the product
should be such a quality that the consumer will continue to pay for it.
76
This presents a problem for those consumers who may lack the ability to
pay for products at a quality level that is safe. A utilitarian theory would
allow the trademark owner to reduce quality in order to reduce prices,
77which would result in a race to the bottom that may harm consumers.
Since the Chinese notion of consumer welfare is tied to a more paternal-
istic concept, a level of quality in trademarked products that guarantees,
at a minimum, that trademarked products are safe to consume, is natu-
rally required. In effect, the trademark law is used as a type of product
safety law, in addition to the other laws that currently legislate product
quality and consumer protection."'
c. Distributive Justice
In granting a trademark registration (or recognizing a right to a
trademark),79 the government provides the brand owner with exclusive
75. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 168 ("When a brand's quality is inconsis-
tent, consumers learn that the trademark does not enable them to relate their past to their
future consumption experience; the trademark does not reduce their search costs.....).
76. See MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 2:4 ("[I]f there were no trademarks ... a manu-
facturer would gain little or nothing from improving his product's quality. Consumers would
be unable to recognize high- or low-quality brands, so sales would tend to go to manufacturers
who reduced their price by cutting comers on quality. The result would be a race to produce
inferior products, rather than competition to produce better ones."); see also Bone, supra note
24, at 2107.
77. See MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 2:4. This is tempered in the United States with the
application of consumer safety laws.
78. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual
Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 953 (2006) ("If the product copy is of
inferior quality, selling it under a trade mark is an offense. .. ") (quoting Mary L. Riley,
Strategies for Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 65 (Mary L. Riley ed., 1997)) [hereinafter Yu, Pirates to Part-
ners]. Interestingly, commentators have long suggested that one way to enforce trademark
rights in China (whether registered or not) is through a focus on quality concerns. A trademark
owner can apply to either the Administration for Industry and Commerce or the Technical
Supervision Bureau (the AIC's authority comes from the Trademark Law or the Anti-Unfair
Competition Law, the TSB under the Product Quality Law or the Consumer Protection Law)
for enforcement of trademark rights disguised as quality-related problems that harm the health
of consumers. Id. at 953-54 n.255. This alternate method of enforcement is akin to the sugges-
tions made in Part V of this Article, arguing that one way to effectively persuade Chinese
policymakers to revise the Trademark Law is by reframing the issues from a consumer welfare
standpoint. See infra Part V.
79. There are two bases that give rise to a trademark right. One is the first-use right,
which provides protection to the first user of a trademark. The second is registration, which
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rights to that trademark.80 A trademark grants its holder the right to ex-
clude others from using a similar representation that would infringe upon
that trademark.8' And in the case of new products where the trademark in
effect provides the only method of description, the trademark owner has
a type of "language monopoly" in describing the new product. 2 With
such "language monopoly" in describing the product, the first market
entrant can discourage competition.8 Today, trademarks are keys to eco-
nomic success for products or services. A famous or well-known
trademarked product or service can garner a significant premium over a
more obscure product or service, even though they may be of the same
quality '"
Application of a redistributive theory of trademark law would con-
tinue to grant these rights but temper them to allow as much access as
possible, while still maintaining the trademark.85 In applying this theory
in a trademark application, the scope of descriptiveness should be broad
and, correspondingly, the scope of distinctiveness should be construed
narrowly. 6 This may prevent a grant of exclusivity to marks for new
products which have no way other than the trademark to describe them,
by deeming the new mark as descriptive of the product, and thus allow-
ing more access to other potential users. In addition, a narrow view of
trademark infringement based on similarity would eliminate exclusivity
to marks unless the allegedly infringing mark was virtually identical,
provides protection to the first applicant for a trademark (regardless of whether the trademark
has been in use prior to applying for registration; however, in some jurisdictions, there may be
requirements as to use within a certain time period of the initial application). The United
States is a first-to-use system and China is a first-to-register system.
80. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 16(1) ("The owner of a registered trademark
shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner's consent from
using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical
or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result
in a likelihood of confusion.").
81. Id.
82. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 172 (providing the examples of Kleenex,
Xerox, and Aspirin).
83. See Fisher, Theories, supra note 48, at 170 ("[T]rademarks can sometimes be so-
cially harmful-for example by enabling the first entrant into a market to discourage
competition by appropriating for itself an especially attractive or informative brand name.").
84. See Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 278-79; Meiners & Staaf, supra note 53, at
931; see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir.
1982).
85. Professor Fisher defines distributive justice as, "To the greatest extent practicable,
all persons should have access to the informational and artistic resources [of art]." Fisher,
Property & Contract, supra note 20, at 1217. Instead of providing access to "informational
and artistic resources," a redistributive trademark theory provides access to the goodwill built
up in a trademark in order to redistribute the wealth created by it.
86. See, e.g., Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 77-78 (2d Cir.
1936) (holding that the word "cellophane" was descriptive of the underlying product and as
such, was a generic term for the product and not a trademark).
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thus making trademarks available to more individuals. In contrast to
utilitarianism, which is primarily concerned with protecting lowered
search costs for consumers, a redistributive theory of trademark law ex-
tends the concern beyond the consumers; lowered search costs to the
trademark owner, and even to other producers trying to enter the market-
place. According to Professor Margaret Chon, the "[intellectual
property] balance question ... [is] which social group (creators or users)
is entitled to use of a particular type of social good (that is, an [intellec-
tual property]-protected knowledge good). 87
From an economic standpoint, intellectual property was positioned
as a social good by China's reform government of the 1970s.88 As one of
the keys to economic success, intellectual property protection was
viewed as a building block to encourage foreign investment in China.
This would allow for growth across all sectors, 9 a belief that persists to
this day.90 China's response to the intellectual property balance question
has been to allow greater access to users of intellectual property and
through the trademark laws, provide access and availability to new mar-
ket entrants (which may include infringers) to some of the economic
value built by previous market entrants.9' Redistribution is supplemented
(and balanced at times) by the consumer welfare goal, as is reflected
through the text of the Trademark Law and the views of the policymak-
92
ers.
B. Historical Foundations
The roots of both U.S. and Chinese trademark law appear similar from
archaeological evidence, as both Roman bricks93 and ancient Imperial-age
Chinese pottery have been found with source identifiers. 94 Similarly, re-
87. Chon, supra note 22, at 808.
88. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 190-91 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., Oxford Univ. Press
2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle].
89. Id. at 192.
90. See Protection in China, supra note 26.
91. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Corp. v. Geely Group Corp., CHINA L. & PRAC., Dec. 2003
(Beijing No. 2 Interm. People's Ct., Nov. 24, 2003), and text accompanying note 44.
92. See infra Part IV.B.
93. See Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADE-
MARK REP. 265 (1975), reprinted in 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222, 223-25 (1983).
94. See Abraham S. Greenberg, The Ancient Lineage of Trade-Marks, 33 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 876, 878 (1951) ("It is to the Chinese ... that one must credit the
first recorded marks of origin. The earliest evidence of the use of trade-marks is found on
Chinese pottery of the period of the Chinese Emperor Hoang-To [2698 B.C.]."); Ke Shao,
Look at My Sign!-Trademarks in China from Antiquity to the Early Modern Times, 87 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 654, 656-57 (2005) ("Various names of the individual commercial
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cords reflect that misappropriation of source identifiers is not a new phe-
nomenon for either country and can be traced far back in both their
95histories. In both regions, protection for such misappropriation was
granted to the original user; however, such protection was not necessar-
ily widespread, nor was it accomplished through judicial channels. 96
European guilds and Chinese clans were generally responsible for polic-
ing the use of source identifiers and for taking action against
misappropriators. 97 Beyond these superficial similarities, the histories of
American and Chinese trademark law are extremely different. The fol-
lowing historical differences will provide insight into the evolution of the
current theoretical underpinnings of the two countries: (1) the genesis of
trademark law in each country; (2) the continuity of trademark law; and
(3) the evolution of principles and goals of each country's trademark law.
1. Genesis of Trademark Law
U.S. trademark laws are organic to the United States: American indi-
viduals and businesses wanted and sought trademark protection.9 In the
United States, the earliest call for government legislation providing for
trademark protection was a petition to the House of Representatives from
Boston sail-cloth manufacturers in 1791.99 The first federal trademark law
was passed in 187 0 ,' and, with a few twists and turns,'0 ' culminated in
producers were found to be marked on a significant amount of potteries excavated from ten
tombs of the Warring States Period (403-221 B.C.) in Hebei province in 1956.").
95. See ALFORD, supra note 68, at 16 (descibing counterfeiting during the Northern
Song dynasty, 960-1127 A.D. in China); Diamond, supra note 93, at 236 (citing examples
from the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries in Europe).
96. See WILLIAM T. ROWE, HANKOW: COMMERCE AND SOCIETY IN A CHINESE CITY,
1796-1889 at 328-29, 334-40 (Stanford Univ. Press 1984) (discussing guild functions in
China).
97. See id.; Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 9
MICH. L. REV. 29 (1910), reprinted in 62 TRADEMARK REP. 239, 246-47 (1972) (discussing
the guild regulations in Milan and Parma).
98. While the early history of trademarks (as source identifiers) traces back to Roman
times and the common law of trademarks is imported from England, see supra notes 93, 95,
97, statutory protection of trademarks originated from the desire of U.S. businesses.
99. Rogers, supra note 97, at 251-52 (citing JEFFERSON'S COMPLETE WORKS, Vol. 7,
563 (1854)). See also SCHECHTER, supra note 72, at 130-33; Benjamin G. Paster, Trade-
marks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 566-67 (1969). Rather than federal
action, trademark law first developed at the state level. See MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 5:3.
100. An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Statutes Relating to Patents and
Copyrights, Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
101. The 1870 law was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879). The authority for the 1870 law had been
based on the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution, which was found unconstitu-
tional. The Supreme Court held that Congress had inappropriately clumped the power to
regulate trademarks in with the power to regulate patents and copyright. As Justice Miller
stated in the Court's opinion, "Any attempt ... to identify the essential characteristics of a
trade-mark with inventions and discoveries in the arts and sciences, or with the writings of
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the Lanham Act in 1946, which remains the basis for federal trademark
protection today.'02 In contrast, the first official Chinese trademark legis-
lation (enacted in 1923) was the result of China's concessions in the
treaties of 1903 and 1904 after losing in the Boxer Uprising.' 3 However,
the passage of this law did not provide real improvement in trademark
protection.' ' With the victory by the Communist party in 1949, trade-
mark protection became minimal and was eventually repealed
altogether.' 5 It was not until the late 1970s that protection for trademarks
was re-established, due in part to American influences. The United
States entered into the 1979 Agreement on Trade Relations with China,'
6
leading to China's enactment of the 1982 Trademark Law. The subse-
quent revisions to China's statutory and intellectual property framework
are due in large part to American activism in China since the 1980s.'0 7
2. Continuity of History
While American trademark legal history can be viewed as an unbro-
ken chain, the history of Chinese trademark law is more disjointed. As a
common law system derived from England, the history of U.S. trade-
mark law stretches back to the late sixteenth century, when the first
judicial case granted a right of action based on mark misappropriation. 108
authors, will show that the effort is surrounded with insurmountable difficulties." Id. at 93-94.
Congress enacted a new law in 1881 (Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502), which was
overhauled in 1905 (Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724). Throughout the ups and
downs of the federal legislation, the common law continued to provide protection. See
MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 5:2 ("By the 1850s, common law rules against ... trademark
infringement were well accepted.").
102. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1141).
103. See Yu, Sweet and Sour, supra note 34, at 3 n.25.
104. See Charles Baum, Trade Sanctions and the Rule of Law: Lessons from China, I
STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 46, 52 (2001).
105. After the Communist party took control in October 1949 and created the People's
Republic of China, all of the laws passed under the Republican government prior to 1949 were
repealed. However, these laws continued in effect in the Republic of China based on Taiwan
(including the 1923 trademark law). The Communist government initially provided for a type
of protection for re-registered trademarks in the 1950s and 1960s, but very few trademarks
were actually re-registered. Charles D. Paglee, Chinese Trademark Law Revised: New Regula-
tions Protect Well-Known Trademarks, 5 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 37, 38-40 (1997).
106. Agreement on Trade Relations, U.S.-P.R.C., July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651.
107. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Prior to the early 1990s, China lacked
the legal framework to adequately handle intellectual property protection. See ALFORD, supra
note 68, at 67.
108. Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An An-
swer to Schechter's Conundrum, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 505, 506 n.2
(1998) (citing to Sandforth's Case, Cory's Entries, BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168 (1584),
reprinted in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY-PRIVATE
LAW TO 1750 at 615-18 (1986)). Prior to the discovery by Professor J.H. Baker in 1979 of
Sandforth's Case, Southern v. How, Popham's Reports 143 (1618), 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B.),
Making Much Ado About Theory
Sixteenth century misappropriation cases have continued to serve as
foundations for modern trademark infringement cases.' °9 While the fed-
eral statutory history of trademark law in the United States has not
always been consistent (such as the Supreme Court declaring the first
trademark law unconstitutional"°), there has never been a total elimina-
tion of trademark protection like in China.
Although China passed its first trademark law in 1923." during the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), all notions of trade-
marks, even as source identifiers, were eliminated."' 2 A popular saying in
China during the Cultural Revolution highlights the prevailing sentiment:
"Is it necessary for a steel worker to put his name on a steel ingot that he
produces in the course of his duty? If not, why should a member of the
intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting his name on what he pro-
duces?"' 3 Trademark protections were not reinstituted until the reform
government of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, and the current Trade-
mark Law was not passed until 1982.
was considered to be the first English trademark case. See Stolte, supra, at 509, 528. But see
SCHECHTER, supra note 72, at 6-12 (in tracing the history of American trademark law, he
argues that Southern v. How, an English case from 1618, should not be considered to be the
origin of American trademark law). American trademark cases explicitly base their precedents
on English jurisprudence. See, e.g., Saxlehner v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 179 U.S. 42, 43 (1900),
which explicitly adopts as controlling precedent an English case, Millington v. Fox, 3 Myl. &
Cr. 338, 40 Eng. Rep. 956 (1838).
109. Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484, 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (1742), was the first English case to
cite Southern v. How, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243. However, the use of Southern v. How by the plain-
tiff's attorney in this case was not helpful to the plaintiff, as the court still decided against
granting an injunction against the defendant. Trademark cases became more numerous during
the nineteenth century. Millington v. Fox, 3 Myl. & Cr. 338, 40 Eng. Rep. 956 (1838) was the
first case that provided "adequate relief against infringement". See Rogers, supra note 97, at
251; see also SCHECHTER, supra note 72, at 134; Stolte, supra note 108, at 517-18.
110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Ill. Yexuan Yang, Keeping a Check on Trademarks in China, MANAGING INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY, Jan. 1, 2005, available at http://www.managingip.com/Article.aspx?
ArticlelD=1321544; see also Ownership with Chinese Characteristics: Private Property
Rights and Land Reform in the PRC: Roundtable Before the Cong.-Exec. Commission on
China, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Mark A. Cohen, Attorney-Advisor, U.S. P.T.O.),
available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/020303/cohen.pdf.
112. See Paglee, supra note 105, at 39 (stating that only foreign marks used in China and
Chinese marks on exports received protection).
113. Bryan Bachner, Back to the Future: Intellectual Property Rights and the Moderni-
sation of Traditional Chinese Medicine, in NEW FRONTIERS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
1, 11 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2005). During the Cultural
Revolution, products were sold under generic labels such as "Red Flag," "East Wind," and
"Worker-Peasant-Soldier." Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and Patent Law in the People's
Republic of China, 21 TEx. INT'L L.J. 259, 272 (1986). From an outsider's perspective, the
result was "that quality varied widely, massive unauthorized copying occurred and consumer
confusion was rampant." Id.
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3. Principles and Goals
During the European medieval period, guilds began to require their
members to develop singular personal identification marks and use such
marks alongside the guild mark.'"4 This development of the personal
mark appears to have been the genesis of the optional, individual, prop-
erty-rights concept in the U.S. tradition."5 Protection in the early days of
the United States was sought through the court system, which provided
recourse against trademark infringers based on theories of fraud upon the
plaintiff."6 Courts saw the provision of this protection as being in the
public interest, as well as in the interest of the trademark owner."7 The
traditional principle of source identifiers as a liability evolved into view-
ing a trademark as an asset,"8 a type of individual property meriting
exclusivity and protection from misappropriators. The goal of American
trademark law was (and still is) the protection of such assets, but only
insofar as consumers warrant the protection." 9
114. SCHECHTER, supra note 72, at 38, 44; Rogers, supra note 97, at 244.
115. See SCHECHTER, supra note 72, at 47.
116. For one of the earliest U.S. trademark cases, see Thomson v. Winchester, 36 Mass.
214 (1837). Chief Justice Shaw stated:
The Court are of opinion, that if the defendant made and sold medicines, calling
them "Thomsonian Medicines," and sold them, or placed them in the hands of oth-
ers to sell, as and for the medicines made and prepared by the plaintiff, so that
persons purchasing the same supposed and believed that they were purchasing the
medicines made and prepared by the plaintiff, it was a fraud upon the plaintiff, and
an injury to his rights, for which the law will presume some damage.
Id. at 216.
117. See Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. D. Trainer & Sons, 101 U.S. 51, 55, 62 (1879). In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Clifford stated:
[I]t is equally true that the owners of such trade-marks are entitled to the protection
of a court of equity in the exclusive use of the symbols they have thus adopted and
affixed to their goods, the foundation of the rule being that the public interest as
well as the interest of the owner of the trade-mark requires that protection.
Id. at 62.
118. SCHECHTER, supra note 72, at 47 ("In the course of time in certain trades, these
police marks or liability marks gradually became... asset marks,-that is to say, they became
valuable symbols of goodwill.").
119. See, e.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1878) (finding of trademark in-
fringement by McLean based on the mark creating a "false impression" in the mind of the
consumer, since if the consumer is able to "discriminate the one from the other" after an "or-
dinary" inspection, then there is no infringement). As such, the fight to exclude another in
using a trademark actually stems from the consumer's perception of the trademark. See
MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 2:14. This consumer confusion test is the same one which con-
tinues to be applied today. See Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 §32(l)(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ II 14(l)(a) (2006):
(I) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-(a) use in com-
merce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
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In contrast, the traditional concept of source identifiers as a way to
fix liability and guarantee quality was carried into the Chinese trademark
laws promulgated in the twentieth century. In 1963, the Regulations
Governing the Control of Trademarks was promulgated by the State
Council which declared that its purpose was to guarantee the quality of
products.'2° The 1982 Trademark Law, seen as a break with old concepts
of trademarks,' 2' stated, "Any user of a trademark shall be responsible for
the quality of the goods in respect of which the trademark is used.'
This quality requirement fulfilled the need to protect the health and
safety of consumers in an environment that traditionally did not have
strong consumer protection laws.'2
In addition, it was not until recently that it was possible to conceive
of trademarks as a type of property right, from either the consumer's
point of view or that of the trademark user.'24 As such, the concept of
trademarks as a type of asset (as embodied by the goodwill of the trade-
mark) never took root in China. It was not until the reform government
of the 1980s that trademarks began to be perceived as a means to im-
prove the economy. After the Cultural Revolution, the reform
government under the reign of Deng Xiaoping reinstituted the pre-
Cultural Revolution trademark law regime in the hopes that China could
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
Id. (emphasis added).
120. Shangbiao guanli tiaoli, art. 3 [Regulations Governing the Control of Trademarks]
(promulgated by the State Council, Apr. 10, 1963), available at http://www.lawyee.net/Act/
ActDisplay.asp?ChannellD=1010100&RID=83990&KeyWord= (in Chinese only) ("Trade-
marks represent the quality of commodities.").
121. See ALFORD, supra note 68, at 74 ("[T]he Trademark Law of 1982 was widely
heralded by both Chinese and foreign observers as representing a clean break from previous
efforts to regulate [trademarks].").
122. Trademark Law, supra note 7, art. VI (1982 version). This is now embodied in the
current Trademark Law at Article VII.
123. ALFORD, supra note 68, at 63, 75. Although the concern for health and safety was
encouraged by the Communist government (see Yu, Pirates to Partners, supra note 78, at
953), the reality was a lack of effectiveness, which remains the case today. See, e.g., WAYNE
M. MORRISON, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 9-10 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Con-
gress Order Code RL 33536, July II, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL33536.pdf; Nicolas Zamiska, Jason Leow, & Shai Oster, China Confronts Crisis Over Food
Safety, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2007, at A3.
124. Until 2004, there was no legal protection for an individual's right to own property.
The Chinese Constitution was amended in 2004 to provide for individual property rights, and
the first property law was enacted in 2006. See infra note 172. However, some scholars argue
that a concept of individual property was embodied in pre-modem China source identifiers.
See Shao, supra note 94, at 658, 662-65, 678 (discussing the various codes, policies and
archaeological evidence to argue that the concept of rights was embodied in the source
identifiers used during pre-modem China).
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catch up economically and industrially to Western nations through West-
ern investment in China.'2 The reform government recognized that, at
the very least, providing an outward appearance of protection of intellec-
tual property rights in China would encourage foreign investment of
technology in the country. 26 With such growth, it was believed that the
resulting wealth could then be redistributed in order to alleviate the
widespread poverty, 27 while protecting the health and safety of consum-
ers. While the 1982 Trademark Law was passed partly as a result of
American influences, the goals of the law remained Chinese. The 1982
Trademark Law embodied the goals of consumer protection and redistri-
bution.
These three differences between the American and Chinese trademark
legal histories are crucial to a complete understanding of the current sys-
tem in China. Whereas the Lanham Act was the culmination of an organic
movement for trademark protection, 2 1 the growth of Chinese trademark
law failed to develop past medieval clan protection until American influ-
125. See Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shake-
speare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 27
(2001).
126. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 88, at 191-92; see also PITMAN B. POTTER, THE
CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE I (Routledge 2001)
(discussing the link seen by China between legal reforms and economic development).
127. Lo, supra note 25, at 29.
128. Since the passage of the Lanham Act, American individuals and businesses have
pushed for expanded trademark protection, even going beyond the traditional utilitarian theory
of American trademark law. The most recent pressure for expanded protection culminated in
the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 1995. With the subsequent passage of
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act in 2006, the traditional theory of trademarks as protect-
ing consumers' search costs has been pushed to its outer limits. Dilution is a cause of action
that can technically provide a trademark owner with complete exclusivity over her trademark,
without looking to consumer perception. The TDRA provides that the owner of a famous and
distinctive mark is entitled to protection from dilution caused by another's use of such mark,
"regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of
actual economic injury." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2007). For a further discussion of dilution,
see generally Robert Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2006); Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilu-
tion Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709
(2007); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, 105
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 98 (2006), available at http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/
firstimpressions/voll05/dinwoodie.pdf.; Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in
Trademark Law, 88 IowA L. REV. 731, 756 (2003). While exceptions exist, such as fair use,
see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3), concerns remain that dilution may create a chilling effect. Lisa P.
Ramsey, First Amendment Limitations on Trademark Rights, in 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 147, 153 (Peter K.
Yu ed., 2007) (arguing that dilution may "unconstitutionally suppress and chill commercial
speech protected by the First Amendment."). As trademark owners can effectively comer a
segment of the English language with their trademarks, developments in dilution have impli-
cations in the First Amendment area. See generally id., at 160-61.
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ences forced further growth of such laws in China.29 The lack of a popu-
lar, organic Chinese movement for trademark laws has theoretically
effected the current system. Without an organic movement, Chinese
policymakers' efforts to introduce external intellectual property rights
into the Chinese legal system have faced a steep implementation curve.
In addition, the elimination of trademarks during Mao-era China cur-
tailed a natural evolution of trademark theory. A great many of China's
current legal scholars, jurists, and practitioners were raised during the
Cultural Revolution, and as such, their experience of modern trademark
law literally began with the 1982 Trademark Law. As China has raced
(under pressure) to catch up to the rest of the world, its legal profession
has focused on the drafting and revising of trademark legislation over the
past two decades.'30 With such focus on legislation, there has been little
time or interest for Chinese scholars, jurists, or practitioners to con-
sciously reflect on the various theories that may underlie trademark law
and adopt any one particular theory. Thus, the twin goals of consumer
welfare and economic growth (on both macro and micro levels) have
been an outgrowth of the historical and philosophical notions of trade-
mark laws, and are reflected in the text and interpretation of the current
law.
IV. ADOPTION OF THEORY: LANHAM ACT V.
CHINESE TRADEMARK LAW
Although no single theoretical justification for trademark law neces-
sarily precludes another, and while some theories can coexist, this
Article chooses to focus on the most influential theoretical justifications
that underlie trademark laws in the United States and in China. These
primary justifications will be discussed through a textual and compara-
tive analysis of the relevant laws, with an examination of the intent of
each law as found in the text of the original legislation.'"' This Article
129. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
130. See Maskus, Dougherty & Mertha, supra note 27, at 311.
131. This Article will follow the general principle that the intent of the law should be
interpreted through the unambiguous plain language of the law. See, e.g., Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (in interpreting a treaty, "in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose."); see also United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511
U.S. 350, 356 (1994) ("When interpreting a statute, we look first and foremost to its text.");
Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) ("Statutory construction
must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."); Botosan v. Paul
McNally Realty, 216 F3d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Statutory interpretation begins with the
plain meaning of the statute's language.").
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will then consider relevant legislative history in which the original draft-
ers or legislators may have stated their purposes in enacting such laws.'
3 2
Lastly, in order to demonstrate that these theories have remained the
same over time, this Article considers the text and legislative history (if
any) of significant amendments, as well as current case law and judicial
statements of the application and purposes of such laws.'33
A. The American Theoretical Justification
Traditionally, the theoretical justification of U.S. trademark protec-
tion in the Lanham Act and the common law has been utilitarianism.
'34
However, some scholars have argued that other theories justify recent
court decisions and legislative actions, which are being used to expand
trademark protection. 5 However, these are new developments, and there
is insufficient evidence that the utilitarian theory of American trademark
law has changed.
The Lanham Act codified common law trademark protection; it was
not an enactment of radical legislation. 3 6 The explicit utilitarian intent of
the Lanham Act is found in Section 45, which has never been amended:
132. Both the Lanham Act and the Chinese Trademark Law will be analyzed to provide a
juxtaposition to highlight the differences between the two laws, and the legislative and judicial
processes of the two countries.
133. While there is a difference between legislative intent and abstract theoretical princi-
ples, it can be a fine distinction. In the case of the Lanham Act, the legislative intent mirrors
the principles of American utilitarianism in trademark law, as the Lanham Act merely codified
the common law and its underlying theory. In the case of the Chinese Trademark Law, the
opposite is true, as the theoretical principles of welfare (consumer and distributional) were
used unconsciously as reasons to adopt the law.
134. See, e.g., MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 24, at 10 ("Utilitarian theory,
and the economic framework built upon it, has long provided the dominant paradigm for ana-
lyzing and justifying the various forms of intellectual property protection."); Benkler, supra
note 24, at 59-60 ("[T]he basic ideological commitment of American intellectual property is
actually heavily utilitarian, not Lockean or Hegelian. The Supreme Court has held consistently
and unanimously that American law explicitly treats intellectual property rights in utilitarian
terms, as limited monopolies granted to the extent necessary to create incentives for produc-
tion"); see also, Bone, supra note 24, at 2105-08; Ramsey, supra note 24, at 194, 249.
135. For example, the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (superseded by the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act in 2006) has been seen as an expansion of trademark law
protection. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1995),
superseded by Pub. L. No. 109-312, §2, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)). Compare Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367,
439-40 (1999) (arguing that the propertization of trademarks accounts for this expansion),
with Bone, supra note 24, at 2122-23 (positing that enforcement costs are an alternative ex-
planation for some of the expansive trademark doctrines); see also MERGES, MENELL,
LEMLEY, supra note 24, at 618 (noting that, since the codification of trademark law in the
U.S., trademark protection has been on an expansive track).
136. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 1 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274
("The purpose of this bill is to place all matters relating to trade-marks in one statute and to
eliminate judicial obscurity, to simplify registration and to make it stronger and more liberal,
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The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the
control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and mis-
leading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered
marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or ter-
ritorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce
against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in
such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits,
or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights
and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting
trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into be-
tween the United States and foreign nations. '37
The first and fourth phrases in this paragraph, "making actionable
the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce," and "to
prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproduc-
tions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks,"
embody the principal utilitarian goal behind U.S. trademark law; namely,
to protect against consumer confusion that would erode the lowered
search costs that trademarks bring.' 5 Evidence of this intent to carry over
the utilitarian justifications from the common law is found in the legisla-
tive history of the Lanham Act, which states repeatedly, "One [goal] is to
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the
product which it asks for and wants to get." 139
The second phrase of the Act, "to protect registered marks used in
such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation," ac-
knowledges that a trademark is an exclusive right, which cannot be
to dispense with mere technical prohibitions and arbitrary provisions, to make procedure sim-
ple, and relief against infringement prompt and effective."). See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J., concurring) (citing S. REP. No. 79-1333
(1946) (noting that "the purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify and unify the common law
of unfair competition and trademark protection")).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2007). Congress had a dual purpose in stating its intent. The first
was to explain the theory underlying the law. The second was to explicitly cite the authority
that gave Congress the power to enact the Lanham Act, which is the Commerce Clause (U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
138. See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 750, 762 (1990);
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Ac-
compli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 466-67 (2005); Nicholas Economides, The Economics of
Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 526 (1988); Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 271;
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
1687, 1690 (1999); Lunney, supra note 135, at 421, 432; I.P.L. Png & David Reitman, Why
Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L. & ECON. 207, 208-11 (1995).
139. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 1 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1274.
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violated by the States.40 This purpose is further reflected in Section 40 of
the Lanham Act, which holds the U.S. federal government (including
"agencies and instrumentalities thereof") and individual States liable for
infringement in certain cases.' 4' While Congress may have overstepped
its constitutional authority, this explicit acknowledgement (even if unen-
forceable at times 42) of an individual's right in her trademark is
noticeably absent from the Chinese Trademark Law.
The third phrase of the Act, "to protect persons engaged in such
commerce against unfair competition," embodies the second utilitarian
goal of trademark law, which is to protect an owner's investment in her
mark and in so doing, provide incentives for continued quality control.'
43
As the Senate Committee on Patents report states, "where the owner of a
trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public
the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation
by pirates and cheats. This is the well-established rule of law protecting
both the public and the trade-mark owner."'4American jurisprudence
acknowledges that the owner of a trademark needs to substantially invest
in her trademark in order to gain traction with the consuming public.'
4 5
Out of this investment comes goodwill, which is the intangible property
that the owner's trademark symbolizes.'4 6 In order to be able to provide
140. See MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 2:10. However, it is questionable whether a law-
suit against a State or the U.S. federal government could actually be brought pursuant to the
Lanham Act. See generally Jason Karasik, Note, Leveling the IP Playing Field: Conditional
Waiver Theory and the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act, 27 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 475 (2005); Bruce E. O'Connor & Emily C. Peyser, Ex Parte Young: A Mecha-
nism for Enforcing Federal Intellectual Property Rights Against States, 10 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 225 (2004).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (a)-(b). But see College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaidpostsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding the abrogation of state immunity under the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act outside of Congress' authority).
142. There have been Congressional attempts to rewrite these provisions so as to validly
exercise its authority to abrogate State and federal immunity. The most recent example has
been the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003 (H.R. 2344 and S. 1191,
108th Cong. (2003)).
143. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 203-04 ("[f stripped of trademark protec-
tion, A would have less incentive either to develop a strong trademark or to produce a high-
quality good."); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 466 (without trademark protection, firms
would be disincentivized to invest in the quality and goodwill of their products and services).
144. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 1 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.
145. See, e.g., Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 434 (5th
Cir. 1962) (Plaintiff had spent over $40 million in advertising its products and slogans. "Plain-
tiff advertised Budweiser beer with the slogans and trademarks on radio stations, television,
national billboards, newspapers and national circulated magazines. The evidence shows that
plaintiff's sales have increased since 1956 and a great portion of the increase is attributable to
the success of plaintiff's advertising.").
146. See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1878) ("[A] trade-mark may consist of a
name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if adopted and used by a manufacturer or mer-
chant in order to designate the goods he manufactures or sells to distinguish the same from
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the benefits of reduced search costs for consumers that an established
trademark provides, it is assumed that brand owners need incentives to
keep the quality of their underlying product and service consistent.1
4
1
Such incentives are provided through the protection by trademark law of
the owner's goodwill that she builds into her trademark through consis-
tent quality and advertising.
More recently, the utilitarian justification for the Lanham Act was af-
firmed in the Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary for the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, in which it was stated that part of
the purpose of the act was "to improve the law's protection of the public
from counterfeiting, confusion and deception."' 48 In addition, the report
goes on to recite the dual purposes of the Lanham Act:
Trademark law protects the public by making consumers confi-
dent that they can identify brands they prefer and can purchase
those brands without being confused or misled. Trademark laws
also protects [sic] trademark owners. When the owner of a
trademark has spent considerable time and money bringing a
product to the marketplace, trademark law protects the producer
from pirates and counterfeiters. 
1 49
While the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996 and other more
recent doctrinal developments provide some support that the consumer-
focused utilitarianism is moving toward a more property-based theory,
°5 0
it does not appear that dilution is gaining much momentum in the
courts.'5 ' Recent case law demonstrates continued entrenchment of utili-
those manufactured or sold by another, to the end that the goods may be known in the market
as his, and to enable him to secure such profits as result from his reputation for skill, industry,
and fidelity."); Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) ("A trade-mark only gives
the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of
another's product as his."); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98
(1918) ("[A] trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in the proper sense, but is merely a
convenient means for facilitating the protection of one's good-will in trade by placing a distin-
guishing mark or symbol-a commercial signature-upon the merchandise or the package in
which it is sold.").
147. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 173 ("trademark law induces its owner to
invest in maintaining uniform product quality").
148. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 1 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.A.N.N. 5577, 5577.
149. Id. at 4, 1988 U.S.C.A.N.N. at 5580.
150. But see Mark McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1840 (2007) (arguing that the traditional basis for trademark protection was
founded on an intention to protect property interests of producers against unfair competition
by direct competitors).
151. As an example, only 186 trademark infringement cases have been decided since
1996 where the Federal Trademark Dilution Act or the Trademark Dilution Revision Act was
discussed. Of these cases, only 57 were decided since the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
was passed on October 6, 2006. These numbers are based on the author's search of
www.lexis.com of the "U.S. combined federal case law" file on February 10, 2009 using "di-
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tarianism in the United States.5 2 As Judge Posner stated in Ty Inc. v.
Perryman, "The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce con-
sumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of
the particular source of particular goods."' And in Qualitex Co. v. Ja-
cobson Co., the Supreme Court, citing Professor McCarthy's treatise,
stated, "In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a
source-identifying mark, 'reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and
making purchasing decisions ' "' . A... lthough there may be other theo-
ries that threaten to become the primary justification for U.S. trademark
law, such theories do not appear to have gained widespread acceptance.
B. The Chinese Theoretical Justification
In stark contrast to American trademark law, the Chinese Trademark
Law lacks any acknowledgement or debate of any theoretical justifica-
tion. The 2007 Intellectual Property Rights Action Plan states that one of
China's objectives is "[lt]o strengthen the study on criminal, civil, admin-
istrative and judicial protection of [intellectual property rights], and try
to produce theoretical outcomes, thus providing a theoretical basis for
lution" and "FrDA" or "TDRA" as search parameters and did not weed out appealed cases or
cases that actually used the FTDA or TDRA as a basis for recovery.
152. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003)
("Federal trademark law 'has no necessary relation to invention or discovery,' but rather, by
preventing competitors from copying 'a source-identifying mark,' 'reduce[s] the customer's
costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,' and 'helps assure a producer that it (and
not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with
a desirable product'" (citations omitted)); Sport Supply Group, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 335
F.3d 453, 460 (5th Cir. 2003) (a trademark "aids consumers by assuring them that products
with the same trademark come from the same source"); Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile
Office Solutions, Inc., 326 E3d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The ultimate issue in this case,
however, is not defendants' intent, but whether the presence of [plaintiff's trademark] in the
URL post-domain path for [defendant's] web page is likely to cause confusion among con-
sumers regarding the origin of the [plaintiff's] product."); Sunrise Jewelry Mfg. Corp. v. Fred
S.A., 175 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The Lanham Act provides national protection of
trademarks in order for owners of marks to secure the goodwill of their businesses and in
order to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers." (citation
omitted)); EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holiday, Connors, Cosmospulos Inc., 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30761, *13 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2000) (stating that trademarks "enable consumers to
recognize and repurchase goods with which they have previously been satisfied."). See also
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (Note that while the Supreme Court
upholds the traditional utilitarian view that "[trademark] law broadly prohibits uses of trade-
marks, trade names, and trade dress that are likely to cause confusion about the source of a
product or service[,]" Moseley itself is about a more recent expansion of trademark doctrine,
namely dilution.).
153. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 971
(2003).
154. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995).
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revising and improving [intellectual property rights]-related laws.""' As
discussed in Part III.B., supra, one of the reasons for this lack of self-
awareness is that the Chinese trademark system has been implemented
into the Chinese legal system by foreigners.16 Without a strong organic
legal tradition for such protection, China has been focusing primarily on
drafting and revising its trademark laws. However, with the pending re-
visions to the Trademark Law, a change in focus is urgently needed.
Without a better understanding of the current theoretical underpinnings
of the Trademark Law, future application of the revised Trademark Law
may continue to appear haphazard to foreigners, most especially the
American government and businesses,"' which is likely to lead to con-
tinued conflict between the United States and China.'
5 8
To complicate matters, any theoretical analysis is hampered by the
lack of publicly available information.'59 In China, there is no recorded
legislative history similar to that in the United States. In contrast to the
Congressional Record, where statements made on the floors of the
House and Senate are in the public record, no such records are available
in China. In addition, legislative activity is quite complicated in China,
with several different governmental organs possessing the ability to pass
nationally-binding legislation.' 6° Furthermore, legislation that is passed
reflects a behind-the-scenes consensus building, meaning that if a par-
ticular law is strongly opposed by powerful governmental organs, it is
likely that the introduction of such law will be deferred until a consensus
of the government can be reached. A recent example of this process is the
Property Law, which was ready for enactment in 2006 but was deferred
155. National Working Group, 2007 Action Plan, supra note 42, pt.II.X.(III)(l). See also
National Working Group, 2008 Action Plan, supra note 42.
156. See ALFORD, supra note 68, at 33. While the Chinese government (led by Deng
Xiaoping) positioned intellectual property rights as a necessary item for the development of
the Chinese economy (see Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 88, at 190-91), subsequent changes to
the Trademark Law (and other intellectual property laws) have been U.S.-driven. See MER-
THA, supra note 3, at 35-76 (describing the U.S. pressure and the legislative changes that
resulted from such pressure).
157. As discussed, application of the Trademark Law by Chinese jurists appears haphaz-
ard to U.S. observers. See supra note 44.
158. See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES & THE INST. FOR INT'L EcON., CHINA:
THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS TO KNOW Now ABOUT THE EMERGING
SUPERPOWER 95 (C. Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy & Derek Mitchell eds.,
2006) [hereinafter CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET] ("China's failure to protect intellectual
property (IPR) is probably the second most important source of friction in the bilateral U.S.-
China economic relationship.").
159. See CHOW, supra note 46, at 152 (2003) (discussing the rules for implementation of
national legislation and the fact that while departmental rules make up the majority of the
legislation passed by the State Council, one of the governmental entities with legislating au-
thority, there is no legal requirement to make its rules publicly available).
160. Id. at 143 ("At the national level, the [National People's Congress], the NPC Stand-
ing Committee, and the State Council all have intrinsic legislative power.").
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for official passage until 2007. '61 While this is not unlike the behind-the-
scenes consensus building among U.S. Congressional legislators, the
difference is that in China, it is not necessarily the voting members (or
constituents) of the National People's Congress whose consensus is
needed before such law is introduced for a vote. 62 As such, in lieu of
legislative history, this Article will look at statements issued by high-
ranking governmental officials regarding trademark protection, which
can serve as an analogue to legislative history, as these high-ranking
government officials were, and continue to be, instrumental in enacting
the Trademark Law and its subsequent revisions.
Similarly, an analysis of judicial decisions in China cannot be identi-
cal to an analysis of U.S. decisions. To begin with, Chinese courts are
not bound by stare decisis.' 63 A lack of stare decisis means that a judicial
interpretation of the Trademark Law may not bind future interpretations
or decisions outside that court's jurisdiction. While cases coming from
more influential jurisdictions, such as Beijing and Shanghai, may be
looked to for persuasive value by other regions, they are not binding.
One example is the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court decision holding
the landlord of the infamous Silk Market in Beijing (the hot spot for
counterfeit products in Beijing) liable for the sales of counterfeit product
at the market.' 64 This was heralded by trademark owners as a landmark
decision, but its reach is limited as merely persuasive in other cities with
similarly infamous markets, such as Shanghai or Shenzhen. The reach of
this case will be further limited as China has yet to develop a compre-
hensive system of reporting appellate-level cases (either officially or
161. See Lindsey Beck & Guo Shiping, China Property Law Bolsters Private Rights,
REUTERS, Mar. 8, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSSP36543620070308?
sp=true. ("The proposed law endured a record seven readings and was pushed off parliament's
agenda [in 2006] after critics warned it would worsen social inequalities and trample China's
socialist principles by putting private and state-owned property on an equal footing.").
162. The Standing Committee, the Politburo and other selected members of the Chinese
Communist Party are the real behind-the-scenes decision-makers. See RICHMOND EDMONDS,
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AFTER 50 YEARS 114 (2000). The NPC merely "rubber
stamps" such approved legislation. See Opinion, China's Next Revolution, ECONOMIST, Mar.
10, 2007, at II. For a more in-depth view of the workings of the Chinese government, see
JAMES ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED EN-
TERPRISES 51-74 (2005); VAI Io Lo & XIAOWEN TIAN, LAW AND INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE
LEGAL AND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTS AFTER WTO ACCESSION (RoutledgeCurzon 2005).
163. CHOW, supra note 46, at 212; Luo, supra note 46, at 105. Only official interpreta-
tions of the law promulgated by the Supreme People's Court are treated as binding principles
of law. These interpretations are intended to clarify the law, but only provide guidance with
regard to specific vagaries left by legislative drafting and it remains within a particular court's
discretion as to the application of the principles. See HONG XUE & CHENGSI ZHENG, CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY xxxvii (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002).
164. CCIT Patent and Trademarks Law Office, Landlord and Tenants Jointly Liable for
Trademark Infringement (May 31, 2006), available at http:llenglish.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/
Article.jsp?a-no=5335&colno=127&dir=200605.
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unofficially), so the text of the judgment is not widely available. 65 An-
other factor that hampers the analysis of judicial decisions is the jurists'
lack of awareness of the social planning theory underlying the Trade-
mark Law, which can generate haphazard results. An analysis of
Trademark Law cases reflects this lack of awareness.166
Even with such drawbacks, an analysis of the modern justification of
the Chinese Trademark Law is still worthwhile. While a handful of
scholars have concluded that the Trademark Law is based on notions of
social planning, there has yet to be a comprehensive analysis of the
available materials similar to the one undertaken in this Article.' 6
As discussed in Part III.B., supra, the Chinese notion of consumer
welfare as the protection of consumer health and safety is a traditional
value in China and continues to be, as more effective product safety laws
develop. 68 The Chinese notion of distributive justice is a more recent
165. See Luo, supra note 46, at 248 ("Although more and more publications of Chinese
cases and judgments have become available, China still lacks a comprehensive official or
unofficial reporting system in which all appellate cases that have precedent value would be
reported and published."). While this case was selected as one of the top intellectual property
cases for 2006 (see Joseph Simone, In the Courts: Holding the Landlord Liable-New Tools
for the Counterfeit Crackdown in China, WIPO MAG., Nov. 2007, available at http://
www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/2007/06/article_0006.html), the prevailing sentiment re-
mains in favor of the landlords. Xu Chao, the vice-director of the copyright department of the
National Copyright Administration), highlights this sentiment: "It is often difficult to shut
down shops selling pirated products .... Many malls let out counters, and each counter is run
independently. If they do something illegal, you would have to shut down the entire mall." Xie
Chuanjiao, Better IP Protection "Takes Time ", CHINA DAILY, Apr. 18, 2008, at 3, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2008-04/18/content_6625873.htm. In addition, anecdotal
evidence from the author's personal experience indicates that places removed from Beijing,
such as Shenzhen, are unwilling to give much weight to this decision.
166. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
167. See ALFORD, supra note 68, at 75 (stating that the Trademark Law "was looked to,
at least by some in China's leadership, as providing an interim device for bringing order to a
fledgling market."); Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 88, at 191 (concluding that a "[social plan-
ning] justification therefore fitted well with China in the early 1980s, and economic
modernization provided the needed 'social planning' justification for a new intellectual prop-
erty system."); Charles L. Miller, II, A Cultural and Historical Perspective to Trademark Law
Enforcement in China, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 123-24 (2004) (concluding that the
Trademark Law stands for quality control).
168. While quality concerns are addressed legislatively by the Product Quality Law
(promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Feb. 22, 1993,
and amended on July 8, 2000, effective Sept. 1, 2000), LAWINFOCHINA (P.R.C.), and the Con-
sumer Protection Law (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress, Oct. 31, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 1994), LAWINFOCHINA (P.R.C.), events during 2007
relating to unsafe food and pharmaceutical products exported from China highlighted some
severe shortcomings in the regulatory enforcement and legislative drafting. See MORRISON,
supra note 123, at 8-1I. Although the government has taken some steps to remedy the prob-
lems, it is too soon to tell whether these reforms will have any long-term effects. See, e.g.,
White Paper on Food Quality and Safety, Aug. 17, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2007-08/17/content_6032557.htm. In addition, to date the government has been primar-
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concept of trademarks and is reflective of the economic reform move-
ment from the 1980s. Distribution of welfare occurs when more people
are allowed access to the market through a narrow application of the
Trademark Law.
1. Plain Language of the Trademark Law
The Trademark Law is supplemented by implementing rules, im-
plementing regulations, and interpretations by the Supreme People's
Court. 169 The plain language of the Trademark Law is the source for the
intent behind the legislation. The intent of the Trademark Law is stated
in Article 1:
This Law is enacted for the purposes of improving the admini-
stration of trademarks, protecting the exclusive right to use
trademarks, and of encouraging producers and operators to
guarantee the quality of their goods and services and maintain-
ing the reputation of their trademarks, with a view to protecting
the interests of consumers, producers and operators and to pro-
moting the development of the socialist market economy.
7
0
The phrase, "protecting the exclusive right to use trademarks ...
arguably has overtones of the American utilitarian theory of intangible
property rights in a trademark in which, through the goodwill, the owner
builds up in her mark. ' But while property-type rights are inherent in an
American trademark, an inference of property-type rights in the words
"exclusive right to use" should not be made without further inquiry. An
individual's right to property was only officially recognized in 2004 with
an amendment to the Chinese Constitution and the very first law to pro-
tect an individual's property was passed in 2007. 72 Since this phrase has
ily focused on the quality of edible products, which still leaves other consumer products vul-
nerable to the same regulatory and legislative shortcomings.
169. See CCH INC., CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GUIDE IT 20-810, 20-820,
20-830 (2007) (providing list of the regulations and interpretations that, along with the
Trademark Law, comprise the current laws with respect to trademarks in China). See also Lo
& TIAN, supra note 162, at 162. Note that the current revisions to the Trademark Law seek to
combine most of these sources into one statute.
170. Trademark Law, supra note 7, art. I.
171. See, e.g., Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194
(1936) ("Good will is a valuable contributing aid to business-sometimes the most valuable
contributing asset of the producer or distributor of commodities. And distinctive trade-marks,
labels and brands, are legitimate aids to the creation or enlargement of such good will."); Hunt
v. Phinney, 2 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1960) ("It has been repeatedly held that
the goodwill of a business is property and as such will be protected by the courts.");
MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 2:20.
172. XIAN FA art. 13 (1982) (P.R.C.) (as amended in 2004); China's Top Legislature
Adopts Landmark Property Law, Mar. 16, 2007, XINHUA, Mar. 16, 2007, available at LEXIS
(Xinhua General News Service file); Beck & Shiping, supra note 161.
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remained unchanged since the first adoption of the Trademark Law in
1982, '7 it would be misleading to automatically infer an intent to provide
an individual right to property. In addition, in contrast to the Lanham
Act's goal, "to protect registered marks used in such commerce from
interference by State, or territorial legislation," there is no mention in
Article 1, or elsewhere in the Trademark Law, of an individual's right to
such trademark, even vis vis the government. Despite the recent recog-
nition of property rights, it is still unclear whether those rights, and those
embodied in trademarks, would extend to protection against infringe-
ment by the government.'74
The second and third phrases, "and of encouraging producers and
operators to guarantee the quality of their goods and services, and main-
taining the reputation of their trademarks," appear to nudge the analysis
back in favor of a utilitarian theory of trademarks. Maintenance or im-
provements in quality lead to the maintenance of a reputation, both of
which are crucial to the function of trademarks under a utilitarian theory.
It is this symbol of consistent quality that preserves the economic effi-
ciency of reduced consumer search costs in the American utilitarian
system. 7 However, maintenance or improvement of "quality" under the
Lanham Act and the underlying utilitarian theory does not refer to the
actual quality of the product, but rather to the consistency of quality
across products marked with the same trademark. 76 This contrasts with
173. Compare 1982 version of the Trademark Law, supra note 7, art. I with the 1993
and 2001 versions. The 1982 version may be found at http://www.chinatoday.com/law/
A02.HTM (last visited Jan. 11, 2009) and the 1993 version may be found at http://
www.chinaconsulatesf.org/englkj/wjfg/t43946.htm (last visited Jan. 11,2009).
174. Professor Alford, writing before the 2004 revision to the Chinese Constitution and
the 2006 Property Law enactment, argued that one of the problems for intellectual property in
China was the lack of property protection. See ALFORD, supra note 68, at 120.
175. See James M. Treece, Trademark Licensing and Vertical Restraints in Franchising
Agreements, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 435, 446 (1968) ("The consumer wants a product for which
there is a reasonable expectation that present quality will be like the quality of past products
bearing the same mark."); see also In re Application of Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 E2d 811, 814
n.15 (C.C.P.A. 1978) ("a mark primarily functions to indicate a single quality control source
of the goods or services involved, and this is meaningful only to prospective purchasers or pa-
trons."); Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7985, *9 (N.D. Ga.
1967) ("The primary functions of a trademark are to indicate a single source of origin of the
articles to which it refers and to offer assurance to ultimate consumers that articles so labeled will
conform to quality standards established .... "); Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Trademarks: Prestige,
Practice and Protection, 4 GA. L. REv 322, 324 (1970) ("[the trademark] assures the customer
that the goods bearing that trademark are of the same high quality which the customer has
come to expect.").
176. See El Greco Leather Prods. Co., Inc. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d
Cir. 1986) ("the actual quality of the goods is irrelevant; it is the control of quality that a
trademark holder is entitled to maintain."); MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 18:55 (providing an
explanation of the quality function, insofar as there is no specific quality requirement, merely
a consistency requirement).
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the consumer welfare concept of trademarks embedded in the Trademark
Law, ' where selling products below adequate safety levels while using a
trademark is a violation of the Trademark Law. 178
When read superficially, the fourth phrase, "with a view to protect-
ing the interests of consumers, producers and operators," also provides
fodder for an interpretation that utilitarianism is the underlying theory of
the Trademark Law, like the second and third phrases. One could argue
that protecting the interests of consumers, producers and operators could
be synonymous with the thrust of the Lanham Act's intent: the preven-
tion of consumer confusion which would erode lowered search costs,
and protection of the property interests in a trademark. But this reading
of "interests" would assume that the Chinese policymakers adopted the
concepts embedded in American trademark laws.
179
For an interpretation of the "interests" from a Chinese perspective,
one method is to look to the articulation of the Chinese interests by the
policymakers. These interests appear to be mainly focused on economic
development,'80 as Chinese policymakers have consistently tied trade-
mark and intellectual property rights to the economic development of the
country. The development of the Trademark Law almost appears syn-
onymous with the development of the economy: "[i]t is the first law in
the intellectual property field that established solid legal foundation in
trademark area for China's rapid and healthy economic development."' 8'
The Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Com-
mittee, Lu Yongxiang, described in April 2008 how China's progress in
establishing and implementing its intellectual property system over the
last thirty years has "played an active and prominent role in standardiz-
ing market economic order ... and boosting economic and social
development ....,,82 Additionally, a June 2008 article appeared in the
government-sponsored newspaper, Xinhua, discussing China's intellec-
tual property system. The article states, "It is China's strategic goal to
promote innovation and economic and social development.'"'83 Further-
more, even the revisions of the Trademark Law in 1993 and 2001 were
177. See supra Part Ill.A.2.b.
178. See Yu, Pirates to Partners, supra note 78, at 953.
179. As noted earlier, reading any type of American property rights into the Trademark
Law would be inappropriate. See supra Part III.B.3.
180. Other portions of the Trademark Law provide an articulation of the historical carry-
over of the consumer welfare interest. See infra notes 188-191 and accompanying text.
181. Protection in China, supra note 26.
182. Symposium on IP and 30th Anniversary of Reform and Opening Up Held in Beijing,
IPR IN CHINA, Apr. 28, 2008, http://english.ipr.gov.cn/en/index.shtml (follow "Government"
hyperlink).
183. Introduction of China's Intellectual Property System, XINHUA, June 16, 2008,
http://english.ipr.gov.cn/en/index/shtml (follow "Government" hyperlink).
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primarily "to meet the requirement of economic development" and only
in part to meet the WTO entry requirements.'"
Lastly, once combined with the fifth and final phrase of the para-
graph, "and to promoting the development of the socialist market
economy," which appears to modify the paragraph in its entirety, it is
clear that the Trademark Law embraces social planning theory. While the
"socialist market economy" has yet to be fully defined, it would appear
from a policymaker's perspective that this would include a redistribution
of wealth from China's economic growth. Some people "need to get rich
first,""'8 but eventually, the goal is for the economic wealth to reach all
social strata.
8 6
Other portions of the Trademark Law provide further evidence that
social planning theory has been adopted as the primary justification. One
example is Chapter VII, which lays out the protection granted to trade-
marks. Where the local Administration for Industry and Commerce
("AIC")'87 determines that there is an act of trademark infringement in
violation of Article 52 of the Trademark Law, the AIC is instructed to
seize and destroy representations of the registered trademark pursuant to
Article 53. 88 And "where it is impossible to separate the representations
of the trademark from the goods involved, both of them shall be seized
and destroyed."'' 89 In practice, however, if the product merely has an in-
fringing label, then the label will be removed, but the remainder of the
184. Id. In yet another example of this articulation, President Hu Jintao gave a June 2007
speech regarding intellectual property protection in China, revealing that progression of eco-
nomic development continues to be one of the main rhetorical reasons for strong intellectual
property rights. As stated by President Hu, "On China's economic protection ... China will be
firmly committed to [intellectual property rights] development." Economic development is
still seen as the best way for China to distribute the wealth across the nation. President Hu
stated further, "China's fast economic development has ... improved the lives of the Chinese
people . President Hu Jintao: IPR Is Common Benefit of All Countries, IPR IN CHINA,
June I1, 2007, http://english.ipr.gov.cn/en/index.shtml (follow "Government" hyperlink).
185. See Lo, supra note 25, at 29 (describing Deng Xiaoping's vision as one to "elimi-
nate poverty without polarizing society into rich and poor strata").
186. See CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 158, at 31.
187. The AIC is the governmental agency primarily charged with administrative en-
forcement of the Trademark Law, although other agencies may have the power to enforce
trademarks due to other concerns such as quality. See supra note 78.
188. Trademark Law, supra note 7, art. 53 ("Where it is established that the infringing
act is constituted in its handling the matter, the administrative authority for industry and com-
merce handling the matter shall order the infringer to immediately stop the infringing act,
confiscate and destroy the infringing goods and tools specially used for the manufacture of the
infringing goods and for counterfeiting the representations of the registered mark, and impose
a fine.").
189. Regulations for the Implementation of the Trademark Law (promulgated by State
Council Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 3, 2002, effective Sept. 15, 2002) art. 45, LAWINFOCHINA
(RR.C.), available at http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a-no=2162&colno=
I 19&dir=200603.
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product will go back on the market. This practice was confirmed by a
state-level AIC, which stated in a reply to an inquiry on the definition of
"destroy" in Article 53 that, "[flor commodities of trademark infringe-
ment confiscated in accordance with the law, those that have useful value
and the infringement trademark can be separated from the commodities
may be disposed of by ways other than 'destroy' ,.'9 In addition, if tool-
ing or other equipment used to make the infringing products does not
bear the infringing trademarks, then the tooling or equipment will not be
seized, and may be left with the infringer.'9' In such instances, this allows
for the infringer not to suffer a total loss on his business, but at the same
time, provides some protection to the brand owner on a limited case-by-
case basis, which reflects the distributive theory of the Chinese Trade-
mark Law.' 92
2. Judicial Decisions
Turning to an analysis of Chinese judicial decisions, a macro-level
review reveals consistency reflective of the redistribution concept of the
Chinese social planning theory. Where trademark infringement is found,
most judicial decisions award a very modest value of damages to the
victorious plaintiffs.
Article 56 of the Trademark Law specifies that the infringer's profits
or the loss to the plaintiff should determine the damages awarded in
cases where a court finds infringement, in addition to awarding the pre-
vailing plaintiff's legal expenses.' 93 However, if the defendant's profits
cannot be easily determined, the default award is RMB 500,000 (ap-
proximately $73,000).194 In addition, if the defendant's infringement is
190. Reply on How to Understand the Relevant Requirement in Art. 53 of the Trademark
Law (published by the State Admin. For Industry & Commerce, Oct. 21, 2002), LAWIN-
FOCHINA (P.R.C) [hereinafter SAIC, Reply]. This practice is also confirmed through anecdotal
evidence provided by MERTHA, supra note 3, at 165, and the author's personal experiences.
191. Article 53 of the Trademark Law specifies that the tooling needs to be "specially
used for the manufacture of the infringing goods and for counterfeiting the representations of
the registered trademark" before the AIC shall confiscate and destroy such tooling. Trademark
Law, supra note 7, art. 53.
192. See discussion supra Part III.B. This is also reflected in the disposal of products
seized by customs, see discussion infra Part V.A.
193. Trademark Law, supra note 7, art. 56 ("The amount of damages shall be the profit
that the infringer has earned because of the infringement in the period of the infringement or
the injury that the infringee has suffered from the infringement in the period of the infringe-
ment, including the appropriate expenses of the infringee for stopping the infringement.").
194. Id. ("Where it is difficult to determine the profit that the infringer has earned be-
cause of the infringement in the period of the infringement or the injury that the infringee has
suffered from the infringement in the period of the infringement, the People's Court shall
impose an amount of damages of no more than RMB 500,000 Yuan according to the circum-
stances of the infringement.").
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unintentional, the plaintiff may not recover damages at all.' 95 To clarify
Article 56, the Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court Concerning
the Application of Laws in the Trial of Cases of Civil Disputes Arising
From Trademarks (the "Interpretation") provides guidelines to the Peo-
ple's Courts in Articles 13 through 17.96
Although the Interpretation gives the court discretion to calculate
damages for the trademark oer, most of the court's decisions award
the maximum damages allowed by law, which in many instances fall far
short of the damages claimed by the plaintiffs.'98 While the published
decisions fail to explain the judges' reasons for their holdings,9 the net
effect furthers what the Supreme People's Court views as its obligations
to society, which are "to solve social conflicts, maintain social stability,
guarantee economic development, promote social harmony, and realize
fairness and equity. ''2°° In granting small awards to plaintiffs, the defen-
dants are allowed to continue in their business activities (albeit
195. Id. ("Anyone who sells goods that it or he does not know has infringed the exclusive
right to use a registered trademark, and is able to prove that it or he has obtained the goods
legitimately and indicates the supplier thereof shall not bear the liability for damages.").
196. Supreme Ct. Interpretation, supra note 44, arts. 13-17.
197. Id. art. 13.
198. A study of intellectual property case awards from 2002 to 2008 show that the aver-
age of damages awarded was approximately fifteen percent of the intellectual property
owner's damages claim. The study combined copyright, patent and trademark cases. See
KRISTINA SEPETYS & ALAN Cox, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS PROTECTION IN CHINA: TRENDS IN LITIGATION AND ECONOMIC DAMAGES 8 (2009),
http://www.nera.com/image/PUB-IPRights-ProtectionChina_0109.pdf. For a sample of
trademark-only cases, see, e.g., Bonneterie C6venole S.A.R.L. v. Shanghai Meizheng Co.,
LAWINFOCHINA (Shanghai Higher People's Ct., July 6, 2004) (awarding RMB 500,000 plus
RMB 11,258 for legal expenses to plaintiff, although plaintiff claimed RMB 1.1 million in
damages and provided evidence of defendant's profits); Nanjing Xuezhong Caiying Co. v.
Shanghai Xuezhong Caiying Co., LAWINFOCHINA (Jiangsu Higher People's Ct., Aug. 26,
2005) (awarding RMB 20,000 to plaintiff, although plaintiff claimed RMB 500,000 as dam-
ages due to its reasonable expenses in enforcing its trademark); Starbucks Corp. & Shanghai
President Coffee Corp. v. Shanghai Starbucks Cafe Co. Ltd., Nanjing Road Branch, LAwIN-
FOCHINA (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People's Ct., Dec. 31, 2005, upheld on appeal, Shanghai
Higher People's Ct., Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Starbucks Case] (awarding RMB 500,000 to
the plaintiff, although plaintiff claimed RMB 1.06 million in damages and provided evidence
of defendant's profits); The Extra-Budgetary Funds Admin. Bureau of Guannan Cty. & Li-
angxianghe Co. v. Tao Qin, LAWINFOCHINA (Jiangsu Higher People's Ct., Sept. 8, 2006)
(awarding RMB 100,000 to plaintiff, although plaintiff claimed RMB 200,000 in damages).
199. See, e.g., Starbucks Case, supra note 198 (plaintiffs had brought evidence of profits
made by defendants but the court held (without analysis) that that the evidence was not suffi-
cient to award anything more than the statutory maximum).
200. Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Printing and Distributing Some Opinions
of the Supreme People's Court About Providing Judicial Protection for the Construction of
Socialist Harmonious Society, pt.I. 1. (promulgated by the Supreme People's Ct., Jan. 15,
2007) LAWINFOCHINA [hereinafter Supreme Ct. Notice].
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sometimes with using a new trademark). 0 ' This outcome is antithetical
to the American utilitarian viewpoint.
In particular, an American viewing the Chinese system through a
utilitarian lens would expect the courts to apply the laws in a way that
would deter future violations, punish free-riding on the owner's trade-
mark and compensate for damage caused by such infringement through a
large monetary award to the plaintiff. This would be especially true in
instances where an intentional infringement has occurred. From an
American viewpoint, the generally small amounts awarded appear to
stem from Chinese jurists' lack of willingness to enforce the Trademark
Law.02 However, when viewed through the lens of the Chinese social
planning theory, the defendant has been punished, but in a manner that
protects both the trademark owner and the defendant, thus "taking the
protection of basic interests of the vast people as the starting point."'2 3 .
Since the plaintiffs are usually large and established companies, they do
not need a large monetary award. However, a large award would, in most
cases, likely put the defendants out of business. As such, an application
of a distributive theory of the Trademark Law militates in favor of small
monetary awards; however, in cases where malicious intent was shown
on the part of the defendant, a public apology may be ordered.2 4 There
are recent cases where the monetary awards have been higher than the
maximum default amount allowed under the Trademark Law. 5 How-
201. For example, in the Starbucks Case, the Shanghai Starbucks Cafd could easily have
afforded the RMB 500,000, as the defendant's profit was in excess of RMB 2.6 million over
the three years prior to the lawsuit (assuming the reliability of the plaintiffs' evidence). See
Starbucks Case, supra note 198, pt.lll. As such, the defendant was able to build up its clientele
by free-riding on the goodwill of the Starbucks trademark and by virtue of the small damage
award, could continue as an ongoing coffee business, albeit under a new mark.
202. See, e.g., Letter from Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA, to Sybia Harrison, Special
Assistant to the Section 301 Committee, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 19-20 (Feb.
9, 2005), available at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2005/CHINA%202005_Feb9_PRCOCR_
Submission.pdf (describing the low level of awards in copyright infringement cases as an
enforcement problem); Ruay Lian Ho, Compliance and Challenges Faced by the Chinese
Patent System Under TRIPS, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 504, 522 (2003) (quoting,
"won the case but lost the money," which is used to describe the enforcement of Chinese intel-
lectual property protection law. "The joke highlights the embarrassing dilemma of a country
trying to conform its IP law to a world standard while at the same time trying to protect its
developing industries.").
203. Supreme Ct. Notice, supra note 200.
204. See e.g., Starbucks Case, supra note 198 (requiring infringer to publish a public
apology). These public apologies are considered a heavy punishment for infringers, as the
apology causes the infringer to "lose face" in the eyes of the marketplace. "[L]oss of 'face'
means reduced social resources to use in cultivating and developing one's connection net-
work" HAROLD CHEE & CHRIS WEST, MYTHS ABOUT DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 48 (2004).
205. See, e.g., Press Release, Yamaha Motor Corp., June 12, 2007, http://www.yamaha-
motor.co.jp/global/news20O7/06/12/trademark.html (announcing that the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the Jiangsu Higher People's Court awarding Yamaha RMB 8.3 million
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ever, these cases should be considered outliers because there are no indi-
cations that large monetary awards are becoming a trend .2
As seen in this section, the Chinese Trademark Law has, from its in-
ception in 1982, been founded upon consumer welfare and redistribution
theories, the effects of which continue to the present day. This may not
come as a surprise to those China scholars who acknowledge that China
is still very much entrenched in socialism with a tradition of paternalistic
government. However, to those in the United States who have blindly
applied the American theory of utilitarianism to the Chinese Trademark
Law, this analysis will provide long-term benefits, as discussed infra in
Part V.
C. Utilitarianism Is an Inappropriate Lens for the Trademark Law
Putting aside the inherent difficulty in applying an economic theory
that promotes efficiency to a socialist-planned market economy, a reduc-
tion in consumer search costs as a social benefit to Chinese society is not
one that is currently supported by the Chinese economy at this point in
its economic development. The benefits of reduced consumer search
costs are not supported because it presumes the ability to purchase con-
sumer products and the continual availability of the same consumer
products.
for trademark infringement of the three defendants. This award was the highest ever awarded
to a foreign company for trademark infringement.).
206. See, e.g., Italian Gucci Wins lawsuit Against Chinese Shoes Maker, XINHUA,
Apr.14, 2008, available at LEXIS (Xinhua General News Service file) (reporting that a well-
known Chinese shoe manufacturer was ordered by the People's Court of Shanghai Pudong
District to pay Gucci RMB 180,000 for manufacturing a line of shoes that infringed upon
Gucci's trademarked pattern, although Gucci had requested RMB 610,000 in compensation
from the shoe company and the department store that sold them); Louis Vuitton Wins Counter-
feit, Patent Dispute Cases in China, XINHUA, Mar. 18, 2008, available at LEXIS (Xinhua
Economic News Service file) (reporting that the Dongguan Intermediate People's Court or-
dered a five-star hotel liable for the counterfeit sales of one of the stores located in the hotel,
awarding RMB 100,000 to Louis Vuitton, although Louis Vuitton had requested RMB 500,000
in compensation); Puma Awarded 70,000 Yuan Over Trademark Case, SIPO, Dec. 12, 2007,
www.sipo.gov.cn/sipoEnglish (follow "News" link; then follow "IPR Special" Link) (report-
ing that three defendants were ordered to pay Puma an aggregate of RMB 70,000 by the
Zhuhai People's Intermediate Court, even though Puma had requested RMB 150,000); U.S.
Outdoor Clothing Maker Wins Lawsuit Against Beijing Clothes Market, XINHUA, Oct. 30,
2007, available at LEXIS (Xinhua Economic News Service file) (reporting that the Beijing
No. 2 Intermediate Court ordered the Beijing Silk Market landlord, the Beijing Xiushui Cloth-
ing Company, to pay North Face RMB 40,000 for allowing sales of counterfeit product,
although North Face had requested RMB 500,000 in compensation); Nike Wins Compensation
for Trademark Infringement Case, IPR IN CHINA, Aug. 24, 2007, http://english.ipr.gov.cn
(follow "Cases" link; then follow "Trademark" link) (reporting that Nike was awarded a total
of RMB 340,000 from the three defendants it had sued in the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate
People's Court, although it had requested RMB 500,000).
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First, the application of utilitarianism assumes ability to purchase
consumer items (as opposed to household staples). However, the average
Chinese consumer lacks the ability to learn about the majority of brands
available for sale, which are generally foreign, as domestic brands have
been slow to develop.2 7 The average Chinese consumer does not have
the disposable income to pay for the premiums associated with high-
quality foreign brands; some research studies have "estimated that less
than 10 percent of Chinese consumers have the level of disposable in-
come that can afford to buy Western products."208 The average per capita
disposable income in urban areas in 2007 was RMB 13,786 (approxi-
mately $2,018), which is a 17.2 percent increase from 2006. 209 The rural
area average per capita net income for rural areas in 2007 RMB 4,140
(approximately $606), which represents a 15.4 percent year-on-year
growth rate.20 Overall consumption as measured by retail sales grew
16.8 percent in 2007.2 ' These statistics show that while disposable in-
come and consumption may be growing hand-in-hand, it is a relatively
new phenomenon.
Second, the application of utilitarianism assumes that the consumer
brands available for sale are fairly static; that the brand a consumer pur-
chased last month will still be available for sale this month. However, the
Chinese consumer market is new and ever-changing. In a market where
"consumers are still experimenting, and brands come and go with great
speed,"22 it is hard to see the benefit of reduced consumer search costs
for the average Chinese consumer. With ever-changing brands, the bene-
fit of reduced consumer search costs is currently low.
2 3
In addition, American utilitarianism does not promote the benefits
that social planning theory currently promotes in China. U.S. trademark
law is not used to promote the protection of the health and safety of con-
sumers, nor the redistribution of wealth. Instead, such goals are fostered
through other policies. In the United States, unsafe quality levels are po-
liced by consumer and product safety laws. However, in China, where
consumer and product safety laws have not been as effective, it is clear
207. Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 88, at 201.
208. CHEE & WEST, supra note 204, at 31.
209. THE U.S.-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, FORECAST 2008: CHINA'S ECONOMY 2 tbl.1
(2008), available at http://uschina.org/public/documents/2008/02/2008-china-economy.pdf.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. CHEE & WEST, supra note 204, at 30.
213. In contrast, the American consumer values the ability to choose between different
brands of similar products. See Bone, supra note 24, at 2108 ("Put simply, if consumers
lacked the ability to distinguish one brand from another, firms would have no reason to create
brands with more costly but higher quality characteristics. Consumers would be left to choose
from a range of products far too limited to satisfy the full range of their preferences, and eco-
nomic efficiency would suffer as a result.").
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that the welfare concept cannot be soon divorced from the concept of
trademarks 2 4 In relation to redistribution of wealth, traditional American
utilitarianism contends that it is through non-judicial means that redis-
tributive concerns should be met.25 Although there are some hints that
China may be moving towards similar thinking, it is too early to tell if
such thought will gain traction or effect the theory of the Trademark
Law.26
Given the disconnect between the two systems, it is clear that a con-
tinued use of utilitarian arguments will not persuade China to revise its
laws or policies in the manner the United States desires. However, there
are indications that an acceptance of trademarks (although previously a
•217
foreign concept) is becoming more widespread. While statistics do not
provide a complete picture of progress, some studies do show that more
domestic Chinese entities and individuals are taking advantage of the
214. There is evidence to suggest that having parallel bureaucratic agencies charged with
the same quality control oversight for trademarked products may spur more effective enforce-
ment of trademark laws. See MERTHA, supra note 3, at 188-92 (describing the competitive
behavior between the local offices of Administration for Industry and Commerce and the State
Quality Technical Supervision Bureaus that create better chances for enforcement of trade-
mark infringement).
215. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 958 (1985) (summarizing the American
classical law and economics viewpoint: "So long as [the laws of economic life] continued in
operation, the egalitarian impulse to redistribute wealth by manipulating the legal system
inevitably involved both injustice and a counterproductive reduction in total wealth."); Pierre
Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem Of Social Cost: A View From the
Left, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 919 (discussing how the law and economics movement has ignored
distributive justice concerns); see generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal
Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistribut-
ing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000) (defending the use of the income tax and transfer
system to redistribute wealth and not legal rules). But see generally Nicholas L. Georgakopou-
los, Solutions to the Intractability of Distributional Concerns, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 279 (2002)
(arguing that law and economics can and should take redistributional rules into account).
216. See e.g., Hu Jintao, Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist
Party of China, Oct. 15, 2007, pt.VIIl.3, translated and published as Full Text of Hu Jintao's
report at 17th Party Congress, XINHUA, Oct. 25, 2007, available at LEXIS (Xinhua General
News Service File) ("We will increase transfer payments, intensify the regulation of incomes
through taxation ... and overhaul income distribution practices with a view to gradually re-
versing the growing income disparity.").
217. See, e.g., Qishan, supra note 29 (describing the June 2008 release of China's na-
tional intellectual property strategy); Yu, Sweet and Sour, supra note 34, at 7 (providing three
reasons for the progress in China); Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away: China's
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 1986-2006, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231,
236 (2006) (discussing the improvements in China since 2001); Anne M. Wall, Intellectual
Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 341,
416 (2006) (concluding that China is taking intellectual property more seriously); see also
infra note 219. If there were little to no trademark protection in China, as some U.S. compa-
nies argue is the case, then the reverse should be true-"The result would be a race to produce
inferior products, rather than competition to produce better ones." MCCARTHY, supra note 54,
§ 2:3.
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trademark system: in 2006, out of the 766,000 applications for trademark
registration received by the Trademark Mark Office, 668,957 were do-
mestic trademarks. 218 The anecdotal evidence arising from a microscopic
level of review shows that more and more parts of Chinese society are
seeing the benefits of trademark protection." 9
If the United States wants to become more successful in its efforts in
China, a justification that resonates with China is needed. As "some
things cannot be legislated," grass-roots acceptance of the importance of
trademark protection is needed for long-term change. 220 As shown in this
section, U.S. utilitarian arguments are unlikely to be a resonating justifi-
cation at this point in China's development.
V. MUCH ADO ABOUT THEORY: PRACTICAL APPLICATION
While theory will never provide complete answers to specific, diffi-
cult doctrinal issues, it can operate to inform discussion and debate,
especially regarding changes to laws and policies. 22 An understanding of
the main justifications that underlie the Trademark Law is the first step
towards improving U.S. efforts in China and perhaps even in resolving
the conflict between the two countries. There are two applications of this
new understanding that can be implemented immediately. The first is a
refraining of U.S. arguments to include elements of the Chinese social
planning theory. 222 The second is to better inform the U.S. educational
218. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA, REPORT ON CHINA'S INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006, pt.III (June 4, 2007), http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/
info/ rticle.jspa_no=81228&col no=102&dir=200706.
219. Intellectual Property Protection in China, Newsletter Regarding IPR (Oct. 30,
2007), (Nov. 1, 2007) http://english.ipr.gov.cn/en/index.shtml (follow "Activities" hyperlink;
then follow "Newsletter regarding IPR" hyperlink) (discussing the application of the trade-
mark "Yuba Village Music-Fed Eco Chicken" in Qionglai village where farmers selling
chickens with this mark have reportedly doubled the price of their chickens). Although some
may question the accuracy of this portrayal (the news source is a Chinese government-run
newspaper), it provides an inkling to the momentum growing at the grassroots level, and a
potential for a future where a utilitarian theory may be applicable.
220. See Robert M. Sherwood, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 37, 44 (2002) ("For an [intellectual property] regime to work well, there must be a
belief in the country that the country's interests are well served.").
221. Fisher, Theories, supra note 48, at 194.
222. This Article acknowledges that there may be political reasons that could preclude
the United States from reframing its arguments from the standpoint of the Chinese social
planning theory, as the distributive element provides trademark access to infringers (among
other possible concerns). However, even if such reasons were to hamper the reframing of the
U.S. arguments, an understanding of trademark law from the Chinese perspective will con-
tinue to be a useful tool for more successful negotiations.
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initiatives aimed at the Chinese judiciary, administrative agencies and
enforcement officials.2
A. First Application: Frame Arguments in
Terms of Social Planning Theory
The recent WTO dispute between the United States and China high-
lights the misapplication of the U.S. utilitarian theory and the lack of
understanding of the Chinese social planning theory. In June 2007, the
U.S. requested formal consultations with China through the WTO to re-
solve three areas in the Chinese law and policy that the United States
perceived as failing to meet the WTO requirements under TRIPS.224
The United States then requested the WTO to establish a dispute set-
tlement panel (the "WTO Panel") 225 in September 2007 after formal
consultations failed to achieve results satisfactory to the United States onthe tree reasof . 226
the three areas of contention. The WTO released its panel report in
January 2009 (the "DS362 Panel Report"), which found partly in favor
of the United States and partly in favor of China. 27 While the United
States may decide to appeal the WTO Panel decision (as may China), it
is unlikely that the areas where the WTO Panel found in favor of China 28
223. For example, education initiatives are being led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
(see http://www.uschamber.comlintemational/asia/china/iff.htm for listings (last visited
Jan. I1, 2009)), the U.S. Department of Commerce (see http://www.export.gov/china for list-
ings (last visited Jan. 11, 2009)), and the University of California, Berkeley, Center for
Research on Chinese & American Strategic Cooperation (see http://crc.berkeley.edu/
newsandevents.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2009)).
224. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States Files
WTO Cases Against China Over Deficiencies in China's Intellectual Property Rights
Laws and Market Access Barriers to Copyright-Based Industries (April 9, 2007),
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press-Releases/2007/ApriVUnited States_Files_WTO_
CasesAgainstChinaOverDeficiencies inChinasIntellectualPropertyRightsLaws_
MarketAccessBarr.html.
225. Press Release, DSB Establishes a Panel on China's Protection of IPR and a Com-
pliance Panel to Review U.S. Implementation in "Zeroing" Case, W.T.O. (Sept. 25, 2007),
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news07 e/dsb_25sepO7_e.htm.
226. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States Re-
quests WTO Panel in Case Challenging Deficiencies in China's Intellectual Property Rights
Laws, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. (Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/
PressReleases/2007/August/SectionIndex.html ("The United States and China have tried,
through formal consultations over the last three months, to resolve differences arising from
U.S. concerns about inadequate protection of intellectual property rights in China. That dia-
logue has not generated solutions to the issues we have raised, so we are asking the WTO to
form a panel to settle this dispute.").
227. The WTO Panel found that China's Copyright Law was inconsistent with Articles
9.1 and 41.1 of TRIPS and that the China Customs measures were inconsistent with the fourth
sentence of Article 46 of TRIPS. See DS362 Panel Report, supra note 40, 8.1 (a)-(b).
228. The WTO Panel found that the United States had not established that China Cus-
toms measures were inconsistent with the first sentence of Article 46 of TRIPS, nor did the
United States establish that the criminal thresholds maintained by China were inconsistent
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will change without the United States bringing another WTO case or a
change in its negotiating strategy.29 In addition, it is unlikely that any
further changes desired by the United States will be undertaken by China
without having to resort to similar tactics if the U.S. negotiating strategy
does not change,3 as the United States has seen that deploying such tac-
tics can alienate the Chinese government and policymakers.' The
aftermath of the 2007 request by the United States has been decreased
cooperation by the Chinese government and its desire to engage in bilat-
eral and cooperative discussions about intellectual property changes.232
The United States needs a new mindset and tools in order to improve its
short-term efforts in China, and more long-term, to come to a reconcilia-
tion with the Chinese system. 33
As a first application of the understanding provided by this Article,
the United States can incorporate elements of the social planning theory
into its arguments. As examples, the trademark-related issues of DS362
will be used to show how the utilitarian arguments of the United States
can be reframed by incorporating the Chinese theory.
with Article 61 of TRIPS. See id. 18.1(c). The criminal thresholds maintained by China are
viewed by the United States as one of the major weaknesses of China's enforcement of intel-
lectual property laws. See 2007 REPORT, supra note 2, at 76. While the WTO Panel clarified
China's obligation under TRIPS to provide for such criminal procedures and penalties, the
Panel Report ultimately concluded that there was not enough evidence to show that China had
violated TRIPS with its criminal thresholds. See Press Release, Office of the United States
Trade Representative, United States Wins WTO Dispute Over Deficiencies in China's Intellec-
tual Property Rights Laws (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/
PressReleases/2009/January/asset upload-file105_15317.pdf [hereinafter U.S.T.R. WTO
Press Release].
229. The WTO Panel decision has left the possibility for the United States to bring a
future action against China on its criminal thresholds as the WTO Panel merely found that the
United States did not bring enough evidence to prove TRIPS violation. See DS362 Panel Re-
port, supra note 40, 7.652, 7.661, 7.667.
230. While the United States only included three areas in the Chinese policy and law that
allegedly violated TRIPS, there are a number of other items that the United States believes
need to be changed. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 36 and the accompanying text.
232. See id.
233. This is true even though it may seem to be in China's best interest to strengthen its
trademark protection in the wake of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and for the upcoming 2010
World Expo in Shanghai. Short-term or region-specific improvements may be made voluntar-
ily but it is highly unlikely that long-term, nation-wide progress will take place. See Yu,
Pirates to Partners, supra note 78, at 991-99 (arguing that while it may be in China's best
interest to improve trademark protection and intellectual property on the whole due to the
Olympics and the World Expo, due to these being "country of countries" events, such im-
provements will likely not extend past the major cities and coastal areas, which are more
economically advanced than the other parts of China).
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The first item of DS362 is that China's prosecution thresholds for
involving trademark infringement are inadequate.i Contained within the
Criminal Law (with respect to trademark crimes, i.e., counterfeiting) are
very vague notions of thresholds needed to be satisfied in order to prose-
cute an individual or a "unit. 23 The United States raised this as an item
of dispute for three reasons. The first is that certain criminal acts of
counterfeiting will not be prosecuted due to these high thresholds. Sec-
ond, "as a result of the thresholds ... there are cases of willful trademark
counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale for which the
remedies of imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a
deterrent are not available in China.' 236 And finally, the United States
claims that these thresholds violate the requirements for enforcement
procedures under Part III of TRIPS. 37
The first two reasons given by the United States come straight from
the American utilitarian theory of trademark law. From this perspective,
the current thresholds contained within the Chinese law are an affront
because they do not provide disincentives not to engage in criminal acts
of trademark counterfeiting. This type of free-riding is exactly what a
utilitarian-based trademark legal system seeks to protect. As explained
by Professor McCarthy,
Such [a] "free rider" is an economic parasite who must be en-
joinable by the law. If such an infringer is not enjoinable, the
quality encouragement function is destroyed. If all may take a
free ride on the successful seller's mark and reputation, there is
238no incentive to distinguish one's own goods and service.
234. Second Submission of the United States of America, China-Measures Affecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2, WT/DS362, May 27, 2008
[hereinafter Second U.S. Submission]. The WTO Panel found in favor of China on this item,
citing that the United States did not establish that these criminal thresholds were inconsistent
with TRIPS. See DS362 Panel Report, supra note 40, T7.681.
235. See Panel Request, supra note 16, at 2.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 3. Part III of TRIPS lays out obligations of member nations to provide for
enforcement procedures (injunctions, administrative relief, border protection issues, etc.) but
the specific provision referred to by the United States here is Section 1 of Part III, General
Obligations, Articles 41.1 and 61. Article 41.1 states in part, "Members shall ensure that en-
forcement procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit
effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement ...." (emphasis added). TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 41.1. The WTO Panel did not
rule on the Article 41.1 claims. See DS362 Panel Report, supra note 40, 7.682.
238. MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 2:4; see also Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art
Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Achieving fame for a mark in a marketplace
where countless symbols clamor for public attention often requires a very distinct mark,
enormous advertising investments, and a product of lasting value. After earning fame, a mark
benefits not only its owner, but the consumers who rely on the symbol to identify the source of
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As argued in Part IV.B, under the Chinese social planning theory of
trademark law, the distributive goal takes into account more than just
consumers and brand owners. Arguments based on free-riding do not
persuade officials who see trademark law protection as a way to redis-
tribute the wealth (even to counterfeiters), especially the wealth of
foreign companies.239 A social planning theory-based argument in favor
of revising the thresholds in the Criminal Law would be one that com-
bined all interests to show that in not providing stronger measures to
criminally prosecute counterfeiting, consumers and brand owners are
disproportionately harmed in relation to the benefit brought about by
keeping counterfeiters in business. In addition, one could also argue that
the majority of counterfeited products available for sale are not in com-
pliance with the minimum levels of quality and as such, harm the healthy
240
and safety of Chinese consumers.
Violation of law arguments are just as unlikely to persuade the Chi-
nese to revise their laws as are utilitarian arguments, although they
provide solid grounds to bring a dispute to the WTO. But China is
unlikely to admit that its laws do not meet its TRIPS obligations; in fact,
Chinese officials strongly assert that China is meeting its obligations and
that "it is not right for [the U.S.] to observe China while wearing blink-
ers . ... 241 Under Part III of TRIPS, Article4l(l) requires that
"Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this
Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against
any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement .... ,242 The term "effective action" is subjective, and TRIPS
a desired product. Both the mark's fame and the consumer's trust in that symbol, however, are
subject to exploitation by a free rider."); Kroger Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 570 F. Supp. 1055,
1060 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("To permit a bystander who has spent a minimum of time, money, and
effort in developing its product to profit by marketing the identical commodity with a similar
name and packaging is contrary to the stated Congressional purpose of the Lanham Act ....
This case is somehow reminiscent of the plight of the Little Red Hen whose friends declined
to plant, harvest or thresh the wheat; grind or bake the flour, but were all too ready to share
with her the bread that resulted." (citation omitted)).
239. The majority of the plaintiffs or complaining trademark owners are foreign compa-
nies, as they have the capital to be able to expend on enforcement activities. See MERTHA,
supra note 3, at 194-96.
240. While the counterfeiting business is increasingly an export business, counterfeit
products are also for sale to Chinese consumers. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not
Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 203, 213-14 (2006); see also
Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM. Bus.
L.J. 317, 357 (2006). A focus on health and safety concerns is acknowledged to sometimes be
more effective than arguments based solely on intellectual property concerns. See Yu, Pirates
to Partners, supra note 78, at 954.
241. West Wrong to Criticize IPR Record: Official, supra note 33. See also Qishan, supra
note 29 (stating that "[Intellectual property rights] protection in China has paid off."); Chuan-
jiao, supra note 165.
242. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 41(I).
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itself recognizes that each Member is allowed to implement the require-
ments of TRIPS according to their "own legal system and practice. 24 '3 As
the WTO Panel declined to rule on the Article 41(1) claims, "' it is un-
clear if this type of argument will be effective in any future WTO
disputes that the United States may bring against China for its intellec-
tual property enforcement. In addition, since TRIPS does not require a
member country to expend more governmental resources on intellectual
property enforcement than in other areas, China may have a good argu-
ment in future disputes that it expends an adequate amount of resources
on intellectual property enforcement vis-A-vis other issues that take
precedence.
The second item cited in DS362 by the United States alleged that the
disposal of confiscated products that infringe on trademark rights by
Chinese Customs is contrary to Articles 46 and 59 of TRIPS.246 Article46
provides that in the first instance, infringing goods seized by authorities
shall be disposed of in a manner that will avoid harm to the brand owner,
but destruction is not required if contrary to the relevant member's con-
stitutional requirements.247 In the case of counterfeit products, the fourth
sentence of Article 46 provides, "the simple removal of the trademark
unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional
cases, to permit release of the goods into the channels of commerce. 248
Article 59 of TRIPS provides that government authorities shall have
the authority to order destruction or disposal of infringing products
pursuant to the principles of Article 46 and further reiterates Article 46's
prohibition, "In regard to counterfeit trademark goods, the authorities
shall not allow the re-exportation of the infringing goods in an unaltered
243. Id. art. I(I). The WTO Panel in the did not rule on the Article 41.1 claims in this
dispute. See DS362 Panel Report, supra note 40, T 7.682.
244. See id.
245. See Yu, Pirates to Partners, supra note 78, at 935 ("If China were able to show that
their enforcement problems with piracy and counterfeiting were no more excessive than their
problems with, say, tax collection (which are very serious), China would be likely to prevail
[in a WTO dispute settlement process]. After all, it is hard to imagine any country putting
intellectual property protection ahead of tax collection. Nor does the WTO require it to do
so.").
246. Second U.S. Submission, supra note 234, at 32.
247. The WTO Panel opined that the United States had not established that China's Cus-
toms measures were inconsistent with this first sentence of Article 46. See DS362 Panel
Report, supra note 40, 7.395(b). The WTO Panel seemed to give particular weight to the
statistical evidence from China that showed "that, in practice over half of infringing goods
seized by Customs in terms of value are in fact destroyed." See id. T7.250.
248. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 46. The WTO Panel did find that the China Customs regu-
lations were inconsistent with the fourth sentence of Article 46. See DS362 Panel Report,
supra note 40, T 7.394.
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state or subject them to a different customs procedure, other than in ex-
ceptional circumstances. 249
While the United States has based this item on violation of TRIPS
(and not a utilitarian argument), the knowledge of the theoretical justifi-
cation for the Trademark Law remains helpful for a refraining of the
U.S. arguments, as the WTO Panel found in favor of both the United
States and China on this item.250 While the WTO Panel found in favor of
the United States by deciding that the "simple removal" of a counter-
feited trademark was inconsistent with the fourth sentence of Article
46,5 this finding is limited to auctions of products and not donations.
2
1
2
Donations of infringing products to charitable organizations make up the
majority of disposal methods by China Customs.253 However, there is no
requirement that China Customs ensure that such donations do not make
2-5their way into the stream of commerce, and this continues to be a way
that infringing products can re-enter the marketplace.
The key to persuading China to change its laws, both the customs
regulations and the Trademark Law, is to persuade them with arguments
that resonate, 55 such as social planning-based arguments. Currently, so-
cial planning theory requires that the manner in which could best
redistribute the wealth and protect consumer safety should be used. In
the case of infringing products where the infringing marks can be re-
moved, this Chinese theory of trademark law is embedded into the policy
and actions of China Customs, where the majority of the infringing
goods are donated to social welfare organizations, with the goods to then
be provided free of charge to those in need.256
In refraining the issue, the United States should focus on a consumer
safety argument and question whether customs officers or other adminis-
trative authorities do a quality check on the products before releasing the
infringing product back into the stream of commerce. 27 It is unlikely that
249. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 59.
250. See DS362 Panel Report, supra note 40, 7.395(b)-(c).
251. See id. 7.394.
252. See U.S.T.R. WTO Press Release, supra note 228.
253. See DS362 Panel Report, supra note 40, 7.349.
254. See id. 7.312 ("the United States has not established that ... (b) Customs has a
duty to carry out necessary supervision of such use...
255. See Sherwood, supra note 220, at 44.
256. See DS362 Panel Report, supra note 40, 7.349 (53.5 percent of all seized infring-
ing goods are donated to social welfare bodies).
257. See First Submission of the United States of America, China-Measures Affecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 49, WT/DS362 (Jan. 30,
2008) [hereinafter First U.S. Submission]. While the First U.S. Submission points out that
there is a concern for defective or dangerous products to be released back into the stream of
commerce (either through the donation to charity or public auction), the United States does
not elaborate on this important item. In addition, while the Second U.S. Submission elaborates
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this can be done, given the magnitude of seized products. In addition,
given the training of officers, one could not expect them to be able to
assess the quality of each and every single type of product seized (espe-
cially products like pharmaceuticals). This could potentially put harmful
products back into the hands of consumers, something that violates the
consumer welfare goal of the Trademark Law. 1
8
B. Second Application: Educate Chinese Lawmakers
Another practical application that can be implemented now is to bet-
ter educate the Chinese lawmakers and other influencers. The Chinese
freely admit that further inquiry into the theoretical bases for its intellec-
tual property laws is needed.25 9To date, Chinese lawmakers have been
concerned with meeting international requirements, and appeasing the
United States in its demands. Over the past twenty years or so, resources
to devote to the study of the theoretical justifications of their laws have
been scarce, as drafting and revising the text of the laws have been fore-
front.'6 A step back from the textual revisions is needed to understand
which policies the trademark laws currently promote and whether these
should remain the focus, or whether there are other theories and policies
that would work better.
This presents an opportunity for U.S. officials, businesses, and
scholars to educate the Chinese lawmakers as to the social planning the-
ory that is underlying the Chinese Trademark Law. Quasi-governmental
entities and universities are already taking steps to provide education for
members of the Chinese judiciary, legislators and other government offi-
cials. 26' Adding this element into already existing programs would
on the high potential for low-quality products to enter the stream of commerce, the United
States focuses on the harm to the brand owner, not to the consumer. See Second U.S. Submis-
sion, supra note 234, at 39. Furthermore, it would appear that China has argued that Customs
officers do have the ability to assess quality levels (see id. at 39 n.170, citing the First Written
Submission of the People's Republic of China, IT 161-62, 173), but the United States has
pointed out that the agreement between China and the Red Cross of China (one of the donees
of seized goods) specifically states that China Customs is not responsible for the quality of the
goods donated to the Red Cross, thus providing an acknowledgment of the potential for unsafe
products to enter the stream of commerce. Id. However, the WTO Panel found the China Cus-
toms regulations were facially sufficient to ensure that defective or dangerous goods are not
donated, see DS362 Panel Report, supra note 40, 7.290-.291, as the United States did not
bring evidence or sufficient legal arguments to prove otherwise.
258. For an example of a successful outcome based on this type of consumer welfare
argument, see Bird, supra note 240, at 357 (discussing the efforts by the Heinz Corporation,
and highlighting the consumer welfare-based arguments made by Heinz in successfully com-
bating counterfeit products).
259. See supra note 42.
260. See Maskus, Dougherty & Mertha, supra note 27, at 311.
261. See supra note 223 for a sample of the educational efforts by U.S. quasi-
governmental entities and universities.
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provide the Chinese audience with a view of the benefits and pitfalls that
come from using a subjective theory to drive policy and law. While the
subjectivity of social planning theory means that local circumstances can
be taken into account to mold the laws to the particular situation, this same
benefit can be a pitfall. In a country that is evolving towards a rule-of-law
262legal system, the laws need to be explicit and applied as uniformly as
possible. While a flexible approach may work for certain situations, the
wide range of subjectivity in the current laws is detrimental, as it prevents
uniform compliance with them. In addition, since social planning theory
is, in some sense, a utopian model, such a theory cannot provide the an-
swers for judges and practitioners in every situation. Under a social
planning theory, there are a variety of differing interests which allow a
judge who is sympathetic to a counterfeiter to set the amount of damages
at far less than the trademark user suffered.26
The United States can and should educate Chinese policymakers and
jurists about the benefits of other theories that may resonate with the
Chinese, which includes increased trademark protection for both U.S.
and Chinese businesses. For example, as more Chinese businesses gain a
foothold into the consumer product market, they will want to protect
their trademarks from infringement both in China and overseas. There
will come a time when China is no longer one of the major hubs for
manufacturing, and Chinese products may be manufactured abroad.
Then, Chinese products will be imported back into China, thus bringing
the problems that Europe and the United States face today-
counterfeiting and gray market products. A different theory, such as a
Lockean labor theory of trademark law26 might provide greater protec-
tion to Chinese trademark owners. Such a theory would allow Chinese
trademark owners to stop the import of gray market goods, regulate how
their trademarks are used in competitor advertisements and better fight
counterfeiting at home and abroad. And perhaps when the Chinese econ-
omy is not so heavily regulated, utilitarianism may provide a workable
alternative justification.
262. CHOW, supra note 46, at 64-65. Some commentators are skeptical of such transi-
tion happening in the near future. See, e.g., Jerome A. Cohen, Opinion, A Just Legal System,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 11, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/1211/
opinion/edcohen.php.
263. Fisher, Theories, supra note 48, at 194.
264. See, e.g., supra note 206.
265. For example, Vietnam or Cambodia may eventually become the world's next manu-
facturing capitals. See James Fallows, China Makes, the World Takes, THE ATLANTIC (July/Aug.
2007), at 48.
266. Namely, that these Chinese businesses have invested a great deal of time and effort
(not including money) into developing their trademarks. This would provide greater protection
if such theory was adopted. See supra note 49 for a description of Locke's theory.
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VI. CONCLUSION
With the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the world witnessed the monumen-
tal efforts of the Chinese government to enhance its protection of
trademarks and other intellectual property rights. 67 However, such efforts
•• 268
were focused only on the host cities, and if history can predict future
behavior, once the spotlight and focus is shifted away from China, all
will revert back to what it was before.26 9 The upcoming 2010 World Expo
in Shanghai will provide another motivation for increased protection ef-
forts, but again, such efforts will likely be focused only on the host city
and be short-lived. Thus, places farther away from the large cities, where
enhanced trademark protection is most needed, will not experience any
changes. What will cause China to permanently change from a "pirate"
to a "partner"?
27
'
One of the answers to this century-old question is to change how the
United States approaches its strategy in attempting to influence change
in China. Understanding the theory that drives the Trademark Law and
the application thereof is the change needed and is the first step in im-
proving the U.S. efforts in China. With this new theoretical
understanding, the United States has the ability to reframe its negotia-
tions with the Chinese perspective in mind. It is possible that, due to
political reasons, arguments based on Chinese theoretical notions of
trademark law may not find favor in U.S. policymaking, but if still stud-
ied and critiqued with proper perspective, they may nonetheless enhance
understanding of the Trademark Law in the United States. This enhanced
understanding will improve the discourse surrounding the areas of con-
tention and perhaps provide pathways to a reconciliation of the conflict
between the two countries. If such change does not occur, the United
267. As an example, the International Olympic Committee heralded China's efforts to curb
pirating of the Olympic games. See IOC Official Praises China Anti-Piracy Efforts, XINHUA,
Aug. 21, 2008, available at LEXIS (Xinhua General News Service File).
268. The Chinese government targeted only the Olympic games host cities of Beijing,
Shanghai, Tianjin, Qingdao, Shenyang and Qinghuangdao, and publicly announced its re-
quirement of "strict [intellectual property rights] protection during Olympic period." Strict
IPR Protection, supra note 41.
269. See, e.g., MERTHA, supra note 3, at 144.
270. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 88, at 192. See also Qishan, supra note 29 (using
as examples the actions taken against the notorious counterfeit shopping centers only in
Shanghai and Beijing).
271. Many commentators have suggested ways in which to convert China from a "pi-
rate" country, meaning one that does not adhere to intellectual property protection, to a
"partner" country. See generally ALFORD, supra note 68, at 95-11I (discussing the history of
Taiwan in moving from a pirate to a "proprietor" as a way to better understand the process for
China); Yu, Pirates to Partners, supra note 78, at 165-242 (providing a twelve-step action
plan for the U.S. to better convert China from a pirate to a partner). Interestingly, it is often
pointed out that the United States itself was only a convert in the last century or so.
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States may experience yet another century of frustration and anger to-
wards China. However, continued confrontation, without change,
between the United States and China will not be productive, as it will not
bring about sustained change.
72
Moreover, an understanding can provide the United States with the
ability to assist China with understanding its own theoretical justifica-
tions for the Trademark Law. With the new revisions to the Trademark
Law and the increased focus of the Chinese government on intellectual
property matters, the time is ripe for an internal education campaign to
analyze and understand what has been effectively and implicitly adopted
over the last two decades: a focus on the relevant welfare and distributive
theories. By increasing awareness, the opportunity for debate as to
whether welfare and distributive theories are truly the best drivers of the
Trademark Law can flourish. In addition, with such open debate, all of
China's jurists can finally be on the same page as to the scope and appli-
cation of such theory to the Trademark Law and haphazard application
of the law can be reduced. Making much ado about the Chinese theoreti-
cal justifications for its trademark laws benefits both China and the
United States.
272. Traditional methods, such as economic pressures, have not worked over the past
century. As such, non-traditional methods such as the one proposed by this Article and by
other scholars (see, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn From Mediators, Business Strategists, and
International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569 (2002) (arguing for the use of a
dispute resolution approach to analyzing and resolving global intellectual property disputes))
are needed to promote sustained changes.
